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INTRODUCTION
There is a glaring inconsistency in the monetary remedies provided under the
federal intellectual property laws. A prevailing patent owner is entitled to at least
a reasonable royalty,' a measure of damages that often supports large money
judgments.2 Copyright owners also recover monetary relief in nearly all cases,
given the Copyright Act's allowance of statutory damages.' Trademark owners,
on the other hand, seldom recover money when they win.4 This divergence of
outcomes is particularly striking because the top trademarks are the most valuable
intellectual property assets in the world, with several top brands valued at over $50
billion.' What is going on? Why are trademarks treated so differently?
1 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2009) ("Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty
for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the
court.!).
2 Very large patent infringement judgments or settlements have become rather common in
recent years. In a recent decision, a district court in Texas ordered Microsoft to pay a small
company $200,000,000 in damages, $40,000,000 in enhanced damages, $37,097,032 in pre-judgment
interest, $140,060 per day in post-verdict damages, and $21,102 per day in post-judgment interest.
i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:07CVl 13, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104 (E.D. Tex. Aug.
11, 2009). The year 2009 has not been good for Microsoft, as it was on the losing side of a patent
infringement jury verdict of almost $400,000,000 in early April, 2009. See Ina Fried, Microsoft Slapped
with $388 Milkon Patent Verdict, CNET NEWS, Apr. 8, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13860_3-
10215680-56.html.
Other large patent judgments or settlements include the high-profile Blackberry litigation,
which was settled in 2006 for over $600,000,000. See Akweli Parker, Inventor's Reaho, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Mar. 23, 2006, at Cl. Microsoft paid over $500,000,000 to settle a patent infringement
suit in 2007. See Microsoft Sel/es a Dispute over a Feature in Its Browser, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, at
C4.
3 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2009). The Copyright Act requires a claimant to make an election
between actual damages or statutory damages "at any time before final judgment is rendered."
§ 504(c)(1).
4 See, e.g., Michael J. Freno, Trademark Valuation: Preserving BrandEquiy, 97 TRADEMARK REP.
1055, 1062-63 (2007) ("Since 1993, trademark damages were awarded in less than 20 cases for any
given year.").
' Two services issue annual rankings of the world's most valuable brands. Interbrand has been
doing such studies for about ten years, while MillwardBrown Optimor has issued its own rankings
for about five years. The 2009 MillwardBrown Optimor ranking, the BrandZ Top 100, ranked
Google as the most valuable brand, with a value of about $100 billion. Microsoft, Coca-Cola, IBM,
and McDonald's rounded out the top five, all with values over $65 billion. See Millward Brown
OptimorBrandz Ranking, http://www.miltwardbrown.com/Sites/Optimor/Content/KnowledgeC
enter/BrandzRanking.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
Interbrand's 2008 ranking had many of the same brands in top spots, but its estimates for a
few brands (particularly for internet and software brands like Google and Microsoft) were
considerably lower than were BrandZ's rankings of the same brands. Coca-Cola topped the
Interbrand list at almost $67 billion. Three other brands-IBM, Microsoft, and GE-were valued
3
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The remedial scheme established by the Federal Trademark Act of 1946
(Lanham Act) is seriously flawed. Trademark infringement causes real harm,6 yet
most victims of infringement receive no monetary compensation.7 Those lucky
few who do obtain money judgments often receive windfalls that far exceed their
injury.' Indeed, the magnitude of money judgments in trademark cases depends
more on the efficiency of the infringing operation than the injury to the trademark
owner or culpability of the infringer.9 Calculators have replaced common sense.
The story becomes even more confusing when one considers what role
culpability plays in the Lanham Act's remedial scheme. Punitive damages are not
allowed,10 but enhanced damages are, particularly when a defendant has acted in
at over $50 billion. See Interbrand Best Global Brands, http://www.interbrand.com/bestglobal_
brands.aspx.
6 Though it is difficult to accurately estimate the overall economic cost of trademark
infringement and unfair competition, a number of studies have evaluated the harm caused by
trademark counterfeiting. A 2004 report by the Commission on Intellectual Property of the
International Chamber of Commerce estimated that the cost of global counterfeiting and piracy was
over 500 billion Euros and rising rapidly. COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Doc. No. 450/986, THE FIGHTAGAINSTPIRACY AND
COUNTERFEITING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (June 7, 2004). According to one estimate, the
United States lost over 100,000 jobs between 1988 and 1998 due to trademark counterfeiting.
INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT ON TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING,
Feb. 12,2002, http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=629&Itemi
d=152&getcontent=3.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Windfall awards in trademark cases tend to occur when the money judgment is based on
some aspect of the defendant's business rather than the plaintiff's injury. See, e.g., Burger King Corp.
v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 934 F. Supp. 425, 427 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (awarding $1,259,663.00 in
defendant's profits despite plaintiff's stipulation that it sought no actual damages); Sands, Taylor &
Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 44 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming award of over $10,000,000 in
damages, an award based on a percentage of defendant's sales); Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977) (affirming award of about $4,000,000
in damages based on a percentage of defendant's advertising expenditures).
9 In one case, the trial court noted that defendant failed to present any evidence of costs or
deductions, but the court still awarded only 60% of the gross revenues because there was trial
testimony of a 40% profit margin. Tamko Roofing Prods., Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23,
39 (1st Cir. 2002). In another recent case, the court held that because the defendant failed to
present adequate evidence of costs and deductions, defendant's gross revenues must be awarded
as "profits." Am. Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 518 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2008).
10 Courts have long agreed that the Lanham Act's primary monetary relief provision prohibits
all punitive monetary awards. A comprehensive review of this issue is provided in Getty Petroleum
Corp. v. Bartco Petroleum Cop., 858 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1988). The Second Circuit in Getty reviewed the
legislative record and relevant cases, and concluded that Lanham Act "monetary relief was meant
to be remedial, not punitive, in nature." Id at 112. See also Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal S.A., 979 F.2d
499, 507 (7th Cir. 1992); Wm. R- Hague, Inc. v. Sandburg, 468 F. Supp. 2d 952, 962 (S.D. Ohio
2006); Cosmos Jewelry Ltd. v. Po Sun Hon Co., 470 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1087-88 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
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bad faith." Confused? There's more. A majority of courts require proof of
willful infringement before a defendant's profits will be awarded," and some
courts have gone so far as to approve profits awards where there is no actual
injury to the plaintiff and no unjust enrichment of the defendant. 3 These awards
are, courts admit, "not compensatory in nature,"'4 and yet the same courts hold
that punitive awards are not available under the Lanham Act. 5
This confusing mess is not the fault of the federal courts. Congress is to
blame, and what makes the situation particularly striking is that the same flawed
remedial rules have remained essentially unchanged since the Lanham Act was
enacted in 1946. Courts and commentators have argued over certain issues 16 and
have agreed on others. 7 But few have challenged the Act's remedial scheme as
" See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., No. 84C8075, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4797, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995) (explaining that a doubling of a "damages" award of
about $5 million to about $10 million was not a penalty, but was intended to ensure the
infringement was not profitable).
12 The majority view is that willful infringement must be proven to obtain an accounting of
defendant's profits. See, e.g., George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537-40 (2d
Cir. 1992) (reviewing cases and explaining majority position). There is a long-running debate among
commentators on this issue, with most commentators arguing that willfulness should not be required
to obtain a defendant's profits. See, e.g., Danielle Conway-Jones, Remedjing Trademark Infringement: The
Role of Bad Faith in Awarding an Accounting of Defendant's Profits, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 863 (2002);
Eugene W. Luciani, Note, Does the Bad Faith Requirement in Accounting of Profits Damages Make Economic
Sense?, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 69 (1998); Bryan M. Otake, Comment, The Continuing Viabihi of the
Deterrence Rationale in Trademark Infringement Accountings, 5 U.C.L.A. ENT. L. REV. 221 (1998); Dennis
S. Corgill, Measuring the Gains of Trademark Infringement, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1909, 1914 (1997) ("[it
no longer makes sense to justify an accounting as compensatory.'; Keith M. Stolte, RemedingJudidal
Limitations on Trademark Remedies: An Accounting of Profits Should Not Require a Finding of Bad Faith, 87
TRADEMARK REP. 271 (1997); William G. Barber, Recovey of Profits Under the Lanham Act: Are the
District Courts Doing Their Job?, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 141, 141-42 (1992).
13 See, e.g., W. E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 664 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that "a
full accounting is proper as a deterrent," despite the absence of any evidence of actual injury to
plaintiff or unjust enrichment to defendant).
14 George Basch Co., 968 F.2d at 1539. The Bassett case cited above also seems to focus on
punishment rather than compensation. "It is essential to deter companies from willfully infringing
a competitor's mark, and the only way the courts can fashion a strong enough deterrent is to see
to it that a company found guilty of willful infringement shall lose all its profits from its use of the
infringing mark." Bassett, 435 F.2d at 664.
" The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided the deterrence rationale cases cited above and
also decided Getty, the seminal case holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the
Lanham Act. Getty, 858 F.2d at 103. In fact, the George Basch decision, the very case that
acknowledged a deterrence-based profits award "is not compensatory in nature," cited the court's
prior Getty decision, as well. George Basch Co., 968 F.2d at 1537.
" See supra note 12 (identifying the controversy over whether willful infringement should be
required to obtain an accounting of defendant's profits).
17 There has been general agreement that the Lanham Act's primary monetary relief
provision-15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)-prohibits punitive monetary awards. See supra note 10.
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a whole.'8 Few questions have been raised about the congressional purpose and
process through which the current remedial scheme arose. This Article presents
these challenges and identifies two fundamental mistakes that led to the Lanham
Act's flawed remedial rules.
The first error was one of implementation. Though the purported "purpose
of the Lanham Act was to codify and unify the common law of unfair competition
and trademark protection,"' 9 the statutory text is inconsistent with the common
law remedial rules of the early twentieth century. This conflict has led to some of
the problems mentioned above.
Congress's second mistake was the decision to codify the common law rules.
The historical development of trademark law is an interesting story of how the old
law and equity court systems worked together to craft a workable scheme for the
protection of trademark rights. But that scheme was far from perfect. Many of
the old common law cases provided either insufficient or confusing explanations
for the remedies granted.' In other cases, compensation was justified through
reliance on legal fictions.2' Archaic legal concepts, including some concepts
rejected by the Lanham Act, played an integral role in the historical development
of the common law remedial rules.' When the full historical story is understood,
it becomes clear that the common law remedial rules should not have been
codified.
1" Some have argued that certain types of remedies are inappropriate. See, e.g., Paul Heald,
Comment, Money Damages and Corrective Advertising: An Economic Analysis, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 629,
649-50 (1988) (arguing that damages should not be based on a defendant's advertising budget). It
also has been argued that courts should be more willing to provide actual damages in trademark
cases. Id. at 657-58 (arguing that courts should use the best valuation of the loss available, as is
typically done in personal injury tort cases, rather than deny injured trademark owners monetary
relief altogether); James M. Koelemay,Jr., A Practical Guide to Monetary Relief in Trademark Infiingement
Cases, 85 TRADEMARKREP. 263,284 (1995) (arguing for increased use of a reasonable royalty theory
in trademark cases).
" Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2 (1982) (citing S. Rep. 79-1333
(1946)); see also Robert C. Denicola, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Federal Trademark Legislation and
the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1996, at 75, 79-80 ("Putting
aside statutory innovations directly linked to the public notice provided by the Act's registration
system, the Lanham Act codifies the basic common law principles governing both the subject
matter and scope of protection."); Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimay of Trademark Incontestabihty, 26
IND. L. REV. 519, 520 (1993) ("Lanham Act's primary, express purpose was to codify the existing
common law of trademarks and not to create any new trademark rights."). See infra Parts II.B. 1,
II.B.2, II.c.2.
20 See generaly infra Parts II.B. 1, II.B.2, II.c.2.
21 See infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.2.
' The principal example is the role the separate law and equity systems placed in the
development of trademark remedies. The Lanham Act created unified trademark actions. See infra
Parts I.A, II.B.
[Vol. 17:245
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This Article provides the historical foundation needed to understand the
congressional errors that led to the Lanham Act's flawed remedial scheme. The
arguments are presented in four parts. Part I presents a brief review of the
relevant statutory text. The historical story is told in Part II, and Part III provides
a brief analysis of the relevant legislative history of the Lanham Act's remedial
provisions.
The two historical analyses-the common law history and the Lanham Act
legislative history-lead to a common conclusion. It was a mistake to try to codify
the existing common law rules. In attempting to do so, Congress ended up with
a set of remedial rules it never fully evaluated and surely did not fully understand.
This conclusion and others are presented in Part IV, which also contains
suggestions for reform. Congress needs to start from a clean slate. An
appropriate remedial scheme should be crafted based on the underlying purposes
and objectives of federal trademark protection.
I. THE STATUTORY TEXT
The Lanham Act's remedies provisions are found in two sections, one dealing
with injunctions,' and another dealing with monetary remedies.24 The monetary
relief section of the Act is longer, more detailed, and includes the provisions
responsible for the troublesome results identified above. 5 In fact, the following
subsection of the Act defines the monetary relief available in most trademark
infringement and unfair competition cases:
Profits; damages and costs; attorney fees. When a violation of any
right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office, a violation under section 1125(a) or (d) of this
tide, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this tide, shall
have been established in any civil action arising under this Chapter,
the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of sections
111 and 114 of this tide, and subject to the principles of equity, to
recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the
plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action. The court shall assess such
profits and damages or cause the same to be assessed under its
direction. In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove
defendant's sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or
deduction claimed. In assessing damages the court may enter
15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2009).
24 Id § 1117.
' Other subsections deal with remedies in counterfeiting and cybersquatting cases. Id
§ 1117(b)-(e).
2010]
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judgment, according to the circumstances of the case, for any sum
above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding three
times such amount. If the court shall find that the amount of the
recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court
may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall
find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case. Such
sum in either of the above circumstances shall constitute
compensation and not a penalty. The court in exceptional cases may
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.
26
It is well-established that where "the statute's language is plain, 'the sole
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.' ,,27 Is the Lanham
Act's primary monetary relief provision "plain"? If so, what are the "terms" to be
enforced? These are the questions presented in many federal trademark cases.
The statutory text is plain on some points. Two monetary remedies, and only
two, are identified: "defendant's profits" and "damages sustained by the
plaintiff., 2' The statute is also plain as to the types of claims covered by this
provision.29  The basic process for conducting an accounting of defendant's
profits is also clearly defined: the plaintiff need only establish the defendant's
gross revenue from the infringing sales; the defendant bears the burden of proving
"all elements of cost or deduction claimed."'3 The statute sets a clear upper limit
on enhanced damages: "not exceeding three times" the amount of actual
26 Id. 1117(a). This section of the Lanham Act has been amended since its adoption in 1946,
but the text concerning the monetary remedies has remained largely unchanged. For example,
in 1976, the Act was amended to authorize awards of attorney fees. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-600, § 3, 88 Stat. 1955, 1955. And in 1988, this section was amended to extend monetary
relief to actions brought under § 43(a). Act of Nov. 16, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, tit. I, § 129, 102
Stat. 3935, 3945. But the text identifying the two primary monetary remedies-defendant's profits
and plaintiff's damages-and setting forth rules regarding those remedies, has remained essentially
unchanged since its adoption in 1946.
' United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235,241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)).
§ 1117(a).
The provision covers claims for infringement of federally registered trademarks. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114 (2009). It also covers so-called "unfair competition" daims, which in fact include a broad
range of claims, including infringement of unregistered trademarks and trade dress, false advertising,
and certain types of false attribution. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2009). Federal dilution claims are
covered only if the dilution is willful. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). Cybersquatting claims also are covered,
though cybersquating claimants also may be able to seek statutory damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d);
§ 1117(d). This subsection also applies to counterfeiting actions, as those actions almost always
include claims for infringement of registered trademarks. But because another subsection provides
more relief (15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)), counterfeiting plaintiffs are not likely to rely, at least not entirely,
on this provision.
30 § 1117(a).
[Vol. 17:245
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damages.3' Finally, the statutory text makes it clear that a court has the discretion
to increase or decrease "the amount of recovery based on profits.
32
Beyond these rather basic, and mostly unhelpful, points, the statute is far from
plain. In fact, the statute raises more questions than it answers. For example,
what is the difference between the profits remedy and the damages remedy?3 3 Are
both remedies available in the same case? If so, what limits, if any, should be
imposed?34
May a court reduce the amount of a damages award? The statute authorizes
enhanced damages and limits the enhancement," which seems to suggest that
damages may not be decreased. On the other hand, the statute states that the
profits and damages remedies are "subject to the principles of equity. 36 What if
a court concludes that a decreased damages award would be equitable? One part
of the text-the reference only to enhanced damages-appears to restrict a court's
discretion, while another-the reference to the "principles of equity"-appears
to grant broad discretion.
The statute says nothing about the substantive showing required to obtain
damages or profits. It states that prevailing parties "shall be entitled," but then
makes that entitlement "subject to the principles of equity. '37 What does this
mean? Profits and damages are listed together without any sort of distinction
31 Id.
32 It is also dear that a prevailing party may recover the cost of the action, and that attorney fees
are available in certain cases. These are not primary monetary remedies, and are, therefore, outside
the scope of this Article.
3' Though this distinction is well understood by most courts and commentators, a number of
cases contain confusing discussions of these remedies. See, e.g., ITT Indus., Inc. v. Wastecorp.
Inc., 87 Fed. App'x 287, 291, 298 (3d Cit. 2004) (affirming an award of defendant's "profits as
damages"); Jama Corp. v. Gupta, No. 3:99-CV-01624, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102 (M.D. Pa.
Jan. 2, 2008) (jury awarded damages, expert testimony was limited to defendant's profits, and the
court indiscriminately referred to profits and damages rationales throughout its discussion).
' The courts have not been consistent in their holdings on this issue, which supports the
argument that the statute lacks clarity. See, e.g., Nutting v. Ram Sw., Inc., 69 Fed. App'x 454, 458-60
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that awards of plaintiff's damages and defendant's profits raised double
recovery concerns, and reducing the profits award, but for other reasons); Dering v. Serv. Experts
Alliance LLC, No. 1:6-CV-00357-RWS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52295, at *15-18 (N.D. Ga. 2009)
(finding identical monetary awards for a contract claim and a trademark claim were a double
recovery because both claims were based on the same acts); Gidatex, S.r.L. v. Campanielo Imports,
Ltd., 82 F. Supp. 2d 136, 145-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding identical profits awards under state law
and federal law were not double recovery because the state and federal laws protected different
interests). But see Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Int'l, 40 F.3d 1007,1011-12 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that two separate awards of damages, one under the Copyright Act and the other under
the Lanham Act, was not an improper double recovery).
35 § 1117(a).
36 Id.
37 Id
9
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drawn between the two remedies. Does this mean that the same substantive rules
should apply to both? The lack of statutory clarity on this critical point has led to
much confusion and controversy, particular on the question of whether willful
infringement must be proven to obtain a profits award.3"
The majority of federal courts have held that a plaintiff must prove willful
infringement to obtain an accounting of defendant's profits.39 This conclusion is
not based on the text of the statute, as some commentators have pointed out.4°
When this rule is applied, it can make profits considerably harder to obtain. This
result leads to yet another question: May a plaintiff seek a defendant's profits as
damages?a" If so, would this sort of claim alter the substantive showing required to
obtain an award of defendant's profits?
The statute is also silent on what the requirements are for obtaining actual
damages. If a plaintiff attempts to recover defendant's profits by claiming such
profits are damages, what rules should apply? Again, the statutory text is no help
in answering this important question. How accurately must actual damages be
quantified? In personal injury and wrongful death tort cases, monetary damages
are routinely awarded, despite the fact that assigning a monetary value to such
losses is a largely arbitrary process. Should prevailing trademark owners get a
" See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
39 See, e.g., 5J. THoMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 30:62 (4th ed., Ret 51,2009)
('To obtain an accounting on profits, the courts almost always require that defendant's infringement
imply some connotation of'intent,' or a knowing act denoting an intent, to infringe or reap the harvest
of another's mark and advertising.").
0 See, e.g., Stotle, supra note 12, at 120-23 and accompanying text.
41 Some plaintiffs have made exactly this argument, most likely to avoid the majority rule that
willful infringement must be proven to obtain a defendant's profits award. See, e.g., ITT Indus., Inc.
v. Wastecorp., Inc., 87 Fed. App'x 287, 291, 298 (3d Cir. 2004). The idea behind this approach is
to claim the defendant's profits are being sought as a measure of plaintiff's damages, and thus
should be subject only to damages rules. Under normal damages rules, however, a plaintiff making
this argument should have to prove that the defendant's profits would have been earned by the
plaintiff but for the infringement. In most modem markets, that connection will be difficult to
establish.
A good example of this type of argument is found in Daiy Group, Ltd. v. Newport News,
Inc., 999 F. Supp. 548, 551-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). The parties did not directly compete, making it
quite difficult for plaintiff to prove any actual monetary loss. Indeed, the plaintiff dropped its claim
for damages during the pre-trial proceedings. Id. at 549. Unable to prove damages, the plaintiff
characterized its request for defendant's profits as a "rough proxy" for its own losses. Id. at 552.
See also DavidJ. Kera & Theodore H. Davis,Jr., A. United States The Fifty-Ttird Year ofAdministralion
of the Lanbam Trademark Act of 1946,91 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 191 (2001) ("Mhe number of cases in
which plaintiffs sought and obtained awards of actual damages remained few, no doubt due to the
fact that such damages are notoriously difficult and expensive to prove.'); Oxford Indus. v.
Hartmarx Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1648, 1654 (N.D. I11. 1990) (explaining the difficulties faced
by a trademark owner who tries to prove actual damages).
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similar break and be allowed to recover actual damages where only a general
showing of injury is made?
Some courts have held that the right to a jury trial in a trademark case depends
on whether the plaintiff has a triable claim for damages. 42 According to this line
of cases, a claim for defendant's profits is equitable and will not support a jury
demand.43 But what about the plaintiff who seeks defendant's profits as damages,
that is, using the same strategy mentioned above? Would this alter the jury
analysis? Should it? Is the damages remedy a purely legal remedy and the profits
remedy a purely equitable remedy? Does the "subject to the principles of equity"
limitation render both profits and damages remedies equitable?
The statutory text also poses hard questions about punitive remedies. The
statute authorizes increased damages and increased profits." Such increases must
be based on the "circumstances of the case."'4 What sort of circumstances justify
increasing an actual damages award? Bad faith or willful infringement quickly
come to mind. Indeed, punitive damages typically are awarded to punish exactly
this kind of behavior, and punitive damages may be based on some multiple of
actual damages. On the other hand, where the actual damages proven are likely
to be less than the plaintiff's full injury, a damages award may be increased for
purely compensatory reasons. The question is what sort of circumstances will
support an enhancement. The statute doesn't say.
The statute does, however, specify that certain awards "shall constitute
compensation and not a penalty."'  Courts and commentators have consistently
read this limitation as a bar to all types of punitive awards.4' But is the statutory
text plain and unambiguous on this point? The "not a penalty" prohibition surely
means something, and it is reasonable to read the text to mean that this restriction
applies to increased profits or damages awards. But what about a punitive
42 The Supreme Court has provided the following explanation of the Seventh Amendment
standard:
To determine whether a particular action will resolve legal rights, we examine
both the nature of the issues involved and the remedy sought. 'First, we
compare the statutory action to eighteen-century actions brought in the courts
of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we
examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in
nature.' The second inquiry is the more important in our analysis.
Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990) (quoting Tull
v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987)).
" See, e.g., Minnesota Specialty Crops, Inc. v. Minnesota Wild Hockey Club, LP, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13991, at *30-31 (D. Minn.,July 26,2002); American Cynamid Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 649
F. Supp. 784,788-89 (D.N.J. 1986).
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2009).
46 Id.
' See supra note 10.
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damages award that is entirely distinct from any actual damages, that is, a punitive
award not derived by increasing the actual damages proven by plaintiff?. The
statutory text makes no direct reference to such awards.
Where should courts turn when the statutory text fails to provide clear
answers? The legislative history indicates that Congress intended to codify the
common law, which suggests that courts should look to the common law
trademark cases of the early twentieth century for answers.' That is largely what
courts did to determine the substantive showing required to obtain a defendant's
profits.49 Most courts concluded that under the common law, willful infringement
had to be proven before an accounting of defendant's profits would be ordered. 0
The same requirement, therefore, was applied to claims under the Lanham Act.
Should the same logic be applied to punitive damages? Or is the statutory text
so "plain" on this issue that it is improper to look beyond the four corners of the
statute? This question is worth asking, for two reasons. First, a number of
modern Lanham Act cases endorse deterrence as an appropriate basis for
awarding a defendant's profits.5 ' Though even non-punitive monetary awards will
produce some deterrent effect, this line of cases comes quite close to authorizing
punitive profits awards under the Lanham Act. If the Lanham Act allowed
punitive damages, courts would not be placed in the difficult position of crafting
remedies to deter, but not punish, truly egregious conduct.
The second reason it's important to ask whether the Lanham Act clearly
prohibits all punitive awards is that such a position directly conflicts with the
common law. As shown above, the common law history has been relied upon to
help fix the rules for recovering a defendant's profits.5 2 Should the same approach
be used on the punitive damages issue? Can one really say the "not a penalty"
5 3
text is entirely plain and unambiguous, while the "shall be entitled' text is not?
The answers to these questions matter because the common law allowed punitive
damages in trademark cases. To the extent the Lanham Act bars such relief, the
Act conflicts with the common law.
At the end of the day, the statutory text proves mostly unhelpful. Congress
surely could have drafted text that would have avoided at least some of the
interpretive challenges described above. If Congress intended to codify the
4 See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389, 391-93 (2d
Cir. 1968) (reviewing common law rationales for awarding profits).
5 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
s See, e.g., W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 664 (2d Cir. 1970); Maltina Corp. v.
Cawy Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 582, 585 (5th Cit. 1980); Roulo v. Bexrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931,941 (7th
Cir. 1989).
52 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
53 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
54 Id
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common law, why did Congress use language that, on its face, seems to create
conflicts with important common law practices? This is perhaps the most vexing
question of all. But to fully appreciate the common law context from which the
Lanham Act arose, one must understand the history of remedies in trademark
cases. It is to that history that we now turn.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW
TRADEMARK REMfEDIES
The Lanham Act supposedly codified the common law, but what were the
common law rules? To understand the common law remedial rules that existed
when the Lanham Act was adopted is no small challenge. One can approach the
challenge by reading cases from the period immediately preceding the passage of
the Lanham Act in 1946. That approach, however, leaves gaps and unanswered
questions. How far back should one go to get a reasonable understanding of the
common law rules? Which issues should be examined? How and why did these
rules develop?
To fully appreciate the nature of the common law remedial scheme that existed
when the Lanham Act was enacted, it is helpful to review the historical
development of that scheme. The common law is an ever-changing creation. To
take a snapshot of such a creation at a particular point in time (e.g., determining
what the common law remedial rules were in trademark cases in 1946) provides
only a small part of the full picture. To fill in the rest of the scene, one must go
back in time. Only when the full historical context is understood, will one
appreciate the full scene captured by the snapshot.
This part of the Article presents the needed historical review. Though much
has been written about trademark remedies over the last twenty years or so, almost
none of that commentary examines the historical development of common law
trademark remedies.5" The presentation in this part helps to fill that void. It is a
long section, accounting for a substantial portion of the Article. To make the
presentation a bit easier to follow, it is divided into three time periods, with each
period being discussed in a separate section below. The time periods are based on
significant events and points of change in the development of trademark law
remedies.
The early period, described in Part II.A, covers the development of trademark
remedies from the earliest known trademark case through 1870. The middle
" One recent article provides an examination of the historical development of trademark law,
but the primary focus is on the underlying basis for protection, not on the remedies provided. The
article, however, does provide an excellent review of the early period of trademark law. Mark P.
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1839 (2007). See
also Stolte, supra note 12.
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period is reviewed in Part II.B and extends from 1870 through 1905. The final
time period, referred to as the late period and examined in Part II.C, extends
from 1905 through the 1946 enactment of the Lanham Act.
It is helpful to keep in mind the purpose of this historical expedition. The
Lanham Act identifies three primary remedies: damages, profits, and the
injunction. 6 The historical review traces the development of these three remedies,
and also examines the common law courts' positions on punitive damages.
Though the injunction has posed little interpretive difficulty in modem times, the
development of the primary monetary remedies is inextricably intertwined with the
history of the injunction. For this reason, all four of the remedies listed above are
examined in each of the sections that follow.
A. THE EARLY PERIOD (1584-1870)
Trademarks and brands have been used for thousands of years.5 7 Trademark
law, on the other hand, is a much more recent development. 8 The earliest known
6 See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
17 See, e.g., FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HIsToRIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO
TRADE-MARKS (1925) (acknowledging early uses of ownership marks, but arguing the modem practice
of using marks to indicate source began in the English guilds); Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and
Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 310 (1979) ('The
earliest use of marks on goods dates to antiquity. ... ."); Gerald Ruston, On the Origin of Trademarks, 45
TRADEMARK REP. 127, 128 (1955) ("The history of marks is very old indeed. I have seen
reproductions of some examples of stone-age pottery bearing markings of perhaps 5,000 B.C.);
WILLIAM H. BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS § 1 (2d ed. 1885) ("The main
subject of this treatise-the symbolism of Commerce--may well be deemed to be as old as commerce
itself."); Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks-Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551 (1969).
" Beverly W. Pattishall, Two Hundred Years ofAmerican Trademark Law, 68 TRADEMARKREP. 121,
121 (1978) (citing Sidney A. Diamond, The HistoricalDevelopment ofTrademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP.
265, 266 (1975) ('The history of trademarks extends for at least four thousand years, but that of
trademark law, hardly four hundred.")); EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADE-MARKS AND
UNFAIR TRADING 33-47 (1914); and, Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trade-
Marks, 9 MICH. L. REV. 29 (1910)).
Frank Schechter, an influential commentator on trademark law during the first half of the
twentieth century, provides the following illustration of the rise in significance of trademarks during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries:
Up to 1870 only sixty-two trade-mark cases in all were decided by American
courts. An idea of the growth of the importance of trade-marks to their owners
may be gathered from the fact that in 1870 only one hundred and twenty-one
trademarks were registered under the Trademark Act,... while in 1923 almost
fifteen thousand were registered.
SCHECHTER, supra note 57, at 134; see alo SIR DUNCAN M. KERLY, LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND
TRADE NAMES 2 (5th ed. 1923) ("The law on this subject cannot be traced back further than the
nineteenth century.'); JAMES L. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR TRADE § 4 (1900) ('The growth
of that recognition [of trademark rights] was very gradual.").
14
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol17/iss2/3
CONFUSION CODIFIED
trademark case in England was decided in approximately 1 584.59 The early history
of trademark law in England is a story of how the separate law and equity systems
jointly shaped the law. The first trademark case was an action at law, but
trademark law did not really begin to develop until the equity courts intervened in
the early nineteenth century. We begin with the common law action, and the first
remedy granted in trademark cases: damages.
1. ActualDamages-The First Trademark Remedy. The oldest known trademark
case involved a dispute similar to modern trademark counterfeiting. The case,
identified as Sandforth's Case60 by a commentator, was an action on the case for
deceit.61 The alleged deceit was the defendant's knowing and intentional use of
a trademark quite similar to the mark used by plaintiff. Both the plaintiff and the
defendant were clothiers, and both made woolen cloth.62 The plaintiff marked his
cloth with the letters "J.G." (apparently his initials) and with a design called a
tucker's handle.6 3 According to the complaint, "the plaintiff had 'lawfully and
Schechter attributed the relatively recent development of modem trademark law to the
changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution in England. Schechter, supra note 57, at 41, 48, 63,
78, 129-30.
T]frade-marks did not develop as valuable symbols of good-will so long as
producer and consumer were in close contact.... Close upon the Industrial
Revolution came a tremendous expansion not only in the means of production
and distribution but, proportionately, in the advertising of goods, in which
process trade-marks for the first time acquired a national and not merely local
significance.
Id. at 129-30. The changes in trade resulting from the Industrial Revolution were, in Schechter's
view, the primary reason for the relatively late development of trademark law.
" The case is discussed in some detail in Keith M. Stolte, How Early Did Anglo-American
Trademark Law Begin?AnAnswerto Schechter's Conundrum, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 505 (1998). There is some ambiguity in the reports as to the year Sandforth's Case was decided.
Id. at 529 n.101.
6 "There is a discrepancy among the six sources as to the name of the case." Id. at 506 n.2.
At least two of the sources identify the claimant as Sandforth. Stolte identified the case as Sandforth's
Case "[t]o preserve the historical quality of the case." Id. The English scholar who discovered the
case and who compiled the reports of the case, identifies the case asJ.G. v. Samford. SeeJ.H. BAKER,
AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 522 n.68 (3d ed. 1990). Baker first identified the
case in an earlier edition of his book. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 385 n.45 (2d ed. 1979). Some of the source documents with reports on Sandforths Case
are provided in J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: PRIVATE
LAWTo 1750, at 615-18 (1986).
61 Stolte, supra note 59, at 530-32 (noting the numerous references to defendant's allegedly
deceitful conduct in the complaint); id at 533-36 (noting the disagreement among the judges as to
whether an action for deceit would lie based on the plaintiff's allegations).
62 Id. at 529-31. The complete text of the complaint from Sandfortb's Case is provided in an
appendix to the Stolte article. Id. at 545-47.
63 Id. at 529. It is not clear what a "tucker's handle" was. Stolte suggests that the tucker's
handle "could have been a tool of a clothier's trade," based on the meaning of the word tuck. Id.
2010]
15
Thurmon: Confusion Codified: Why Trademark Remedies Make No Sense
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2010
J. INTELL PROP. L
honestly obtained and acquired much gain and profit from the making and selling
of such cloths, for the further support and living of the same plaintiff and his
whole family.' " Customers apparently identified the plaintiff's woolen cloth by
the presence of his mark, just as consumers identify desired goods by their
trademarks today.6"
The Sandforth's Case complaint further "alleged that the defendant willfully
schemed and plotted 'to hinder the same plaintiff in selling such cloths of his and
to take away and worsen the opinion and esteem which the aforesaid merchants
and subjects had concerning the cloths of the same plaintiff.' "' The defendant
made lower quality woolen cloth " 'and deceitfully marked the same cloths with
the aforesaid letters 'J.G.' and with the aforesaid mark called a tucker's handle; and
exposed for sale the same cloths... as the cloths of the same plaintiff.' ,67
Sandforth's Case sets out a straightforward claim of trademark infringement, at
least when viewed from the context of modern trademark practice. 6' The plaintiff
used a distinctive mark and developed a strong reputation for quality with his
customers. The defendant used a highly similar mark on inferior goods without
the plaintiff's authorization. Customers apparently bought the defendant's cloth
thinking the cloth was made by the plaintiff and were disappointed to find the
cloth was a lower quality than expected. The plaintiff lost sales directly (i.e., each
sale made by the defendant apparently was a sale the plaintiff would have made
but for the infringement) and his reputation was injured by the poor quality of the
infringing cloth. As a result of the latter injury, which likely led to additional lost
sales, the plaintiff's ultimate injury likely exceeded any amount calculated from the
defendant's sales volume.6
9
If the plaintiff in Sandforth's Case proved his allegations at trial, a point not
entirely clear from the reports, 70 the common law court would have awarded
damages, the sole remedy available in an action at law.7' But how would the
plaintiff quantify his damages? The common law did not allow discovery,7 so it
at 529 n.106.
4Id at 530 (citation omitted).
65 Id at 530-31 (citation omitted).
6 Id. at 530 (quoting BAKER & MILSOM, smpra note 60, at 616).
67 Id at 530-31 (citation omitted).
6' Id. at 531-32 (noting the strength of the plaintiffs claims in Sandforth's Case).
69 The difficulty in determining the volume of sales lost due to infringement is noted in many
trademark cases. See supra note 41.
70 Stolte, supra note 59, at 533.
71 As noted above, the reports do not discuss the remedy. In addition, the reports are not
entirely clear as to the result, though it appears the majority of the judges concluded the action
would lie and that plaintiff had presented sufficient proof of deceit. Id. at 533-36.
72 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (one
reason patent owners preferred to bring patent infringement actions in equity was the availability
of discovery, which was lacking in the law courts); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
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may have been difficult for the plaintiff to determine the actual volume of sales
made by the defendant under the infringing mark. 3 Without such evidence, the
plaintiff would be left to speculate at how much its losses were.
The plaintiff in Sandforth's Case may have faced an even more troubling
problem than an inadequate damages award. The common law courts did not
issue injunctions.74 Thus, even if the plaintiff prevailed in Sandforth's Case, the
defendant remained free to continue using the plaintiff's mark, albeit at the risk
of further damages awards. This risk may have been insufficient to deter
infringers, given the difficulty a plaintiff faced in proving its damages.75
The inadequacy of the damages remedy provided in common law trademark
infringement actions remained a problem for over 200 years after Sandforth's Case.
The following excerpt from a letter written by a Philadelphia businessman to a
Boston newspaper in 1791 provides a good illustration of the problem:
[W] hen a person thus injured [by trademark infringement], discovers
and brings to publick notice the aggressor, he can obtain no redress
adequate to the magnitude of the injury he has sustained, although
he may go to an enormous expense and deal of trouble in the
business, as well as a waste of time, and after all is perhaps allowed
Co., 478 F. Supp. 889,918 n.45 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("[O]nly in equity could discovery be compelled.');
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITYJURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND
AND AMERICA §§ 109-115 (14th ed. 1918) (describing the discovery practice in equity); Patrick
Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment: A Commentary on the Zenith Case, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 1571, 1573 (1983) (discovery was "unknown to the common law"); John C. McCoid, II, Right
to Jury Trial in Bankrupty: Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 15, 20 (1991)
("[T]here were some procedures, such as discovery and accounting, that were available only in
equity.'); Sarah N. Welling, Discovery of Nonparties' Tangible Things Under the Federal Rues of Civil
Procedure, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 110, 130-31 (1983).
" "In many cases, the aggrieved party might be at a great disadvantage, unless he had some
means of access to his opponent's books and papers. To enable him to fix the amount of injury
done by the wrongful conduct of the other, he must look to discovery." BROWNE, supra note 57,
§ 469.
7" Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1567; 5 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 287-88 (2d ed. 1937); Devlin, supra note 72; C.C. Langdell,A Brief Survy ofEqui Jurisdiction, 1
1ARV. L. REV. 111,120-21 (1887).
" See, e.g., Langdell, supra note 74, at 126 (noting that the common law remedy was "very
inadequate" in cases of patent or copyright infringement, in part because it was "extremely difficult
to prove the extent of the infringement ... ).'. The concern that undercompensating prevailing
plaintiffs could encourage further infringement has been recognized by modem courts too. See, e.g.,
Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cit. 1985) ("qe trial court's
primary function is to make violations of the Lanham Act unprofitable to the infringing party.");
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., 692 F.2d 1272, 1274 (9th Cit. 1982) (noting that
monetary awards failing to render intentional infringement unprofitable "would encourage a
counterfeiter to merely switch from one infringing scheme to another...").
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by a jury, moderate damages by no means equivalent to the loss
sustained, much less does it prove a salutary remedy against future
offences of the like nature. 6
The writer called for a "general act of Congress" to end these difficulties.' No
such Congressional action occurred until almost 100 years later.7 8
The damages remedy provided in early common law trademark actions was
grossly inadequate. Indeed, there are no known common law trademark cases
between Sandforth's Case in about 1584 and the first reported trademark case in
equity in 1803, a period of over 200 years.79
76 SCHECHTER, supra note 57, at 133.
77 Id.
7' Thomas Jefferson, however, recommended in 1791 that Congress enact a federal trademark
statute. As Secretary of State, Jefferson received a petition from certain makers of sail cloth in
Boston, a petition that apparently raised concerns similar to those quoted above. Jefferson
responded:
The Secretary of State ... Reports, That it would, in his opinion, contribute to
fidelity in the execution of manufacturers, to secure to every manufactory an
exclusive right to some mark on its wares, proper to itself. That this should be
done by general laws, extending equal right to every case to which the authority
of the legislature should be competent.
3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 156-57 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh
eds., 1904).
" One of the primary resources used for the analysis of older cases is an early digest of
trademark cases. ROWLAND Cox, A MANUAL OF TRADE-MARK CASES (2d ed. 1892). The Cox
digest does not directly identify or discuss Sandfortb's Case, but Cox does provide citations and
summaries of other early trademark cases. Three actions at law are identified in the Cox digest
during the period between 1584 and 1803, but none of the cases involved trademark infringement
claims. Indeed, a review of the earliest cases in the Cox digest shows the inclusion of many cases
involving disputes over the right of heirs and other successors to business interests. These disputes
did at times include questions of whether certain parties were entitled to continue business under
a particular trade name, but the issues were resolved on grounds other than the common law action
of deceit.
The three actions at law reported in the Cox digest for the time period stated above are:
Worralv. Hand, Peake 105 (Nisi Prius 1791) (an action on the case for assumpsit for goods sold and
delivered; no trademark or trade name issue involved); Jendwine v. S/ade, 2 Esp. N.P.C. 572 (Nisi
Prius 1797) (action for damages based on copied paintings; facts resemble a copyright dispute, but
the action was brought as a warranty claim; the court rejected the claim); Bunn v. Guy, 4 East 190
(King's Bench 1803) (contract dispute sent to the King's Bench from chancery (i.e., equity) court;
the court held that a non-compete agreement was enforceable under contract law).
The Bunn v. Guy case did involve a trade name issue, because the defendant sold his law
practice and agreed not to practice law using his name for a certain period of time. The issue,
however, was presented and resolved on the contract question.
[Vol. 17:245
18
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol17/iss2/3
CONFUSION CODIFIED
2. Equity Intervenes to Grant Injunctions. The first report of an injunction being
granted in a trademark case occurred in 1803, in the case of Hogg v. Kirby.s The
facts of the case are roughly analogous to those in Sandfortb's Case, but the impact
of the decision could hardly have been more different. While the common law
trademark action languished for over 200 years, the trademark action in equity
quickly became the driving force in the development of trademark law.
The trademark infringement action seemed a perfect fit for equity. One of the
primary justifications for equity jurisdiction during this period was the inadequacy
of the relief provided at common law.81 As explained in the preceding section, the
damages remedy provided in early common law trademark actions was clearly
inadequate. It failed to stop the infringement, and it probably failed to adequately
compensate the trademark owner in most cases. Indeed, the most surprising fact
concerning the development of the equitable trademark action is that it came so
late.8
2
The plaintiff in Hogg v. Kirby was owner of "The Wonderful Magazine." 3
Defendant was a former publisher of plaintiff's magazine." After a dispute, the
plaintiff discharged the defendant, and the plaintiff began publishing the magazine
himself.8 5 The defendant responded by publishing a magazine under an almost
identical name and touting the magazine as a "New Series Improved" version of
the plaintiff's magazine.' Unlike the plaintiff in Sandfortb's Case, who filed his
claim as a common law action for deceit, the magazine owner in Hogg v. Kir y
petitioned the Court of Chancery for an injunction and an accounting of the
defendant's profits.8 7 The equity court allowed the petition because:
A Court of Equity in these cases is not content with an action for
damages; for it is nearly impossible to know the extent of the
damage ; and therefore the remedy here, though not compensating
o 8 Ves. Jun. 215, 32 Eng. Rep. 336 (Ch. 1803). There is an earlier reported trademark
infringement action in equity, but the Chancellor denied relief in that case. Blanchard v. Hill, 2
Ark. 484, 26 Eng. Rep. 692 (Ch. 1742).
8 Devlin, supra note 72, at 1572 ("[E]quity created the greater part of its jurisdiction by
abstractions from the common law. Suitors at common law who found its processes inequitable
petitioned the Chancellor to intervene."); 1 JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 108, at 138-40, § 127, at 168-69, § 139, at 191-93 (5th ed. 1941); 4 id § 1420,
at 1076-77; GEORGE W. KEETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY 20 (5th ed. 1961).
82 Schechter posited that trademark law developed slowly until the nineteenth century because
most commerce was local prior to the industrial revolution. ScHECHTEIR, supra note 57.
83 Hogg, 8 Ves. Jun. at 215, 32 Eng. Rep. at 336.
84 Id
s Id. at 215, 32 Eng. Rep. at 336.
8 Id at 215, 32 Eng. Rep. at 336-37.
87 Id. at 215-16, 32 Eng. Rep. at 337.
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the pecuniary damage except by an account of the profits, is the
best: the remedy by an injunction and account.'
Despite this language, the chancellor in Hogg v. Kirby refused to order an
accounting, a point taken up in the next section. An injunction was entered,
however, and a clear precedent established. 89
For many decades after Hogg v. Irby was decided, the trademark action in
equity was greatly preferred over the action at law. During the period
of 1803-1849, for example, there were 43 reported trademark actions in equity in
England and the United States.' ° There were only seven reported trademark
actions at law during the same period.91
Not only were there more trademark cases in equity, the reported equity cases
led the way in the development of the substantive standards for the trademark
infringement action. In Hogg v. Kirby, the Chancellor noted that defendant's
actions had confused purchasers and he found the infringement a "fraud on the
' Id. at 223, 32 Eng. Rep. at 339 (the cases referred to in the quote were copyright cases, not
trademark cases, but the Lord Chancellor relied upon those decisions as support for his jurisdiction
over the trademark dispute in Hogg v. Kirby).
'9 See, e.g., Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, 17 Ves. Jun. 298, 34 Eng. Rep. 115 (Ch. 1810)
(injunction granted citing Hogg v. Kirby as authority); Sedon v. Senate, 2 V. & B. 220 (Master
Rolls 1811) (reported at No. 18 in Cox, supra note 79) (injunction granted where defendant sold
medicine similar to that sold by plaintiff and where defendant's advertising used phrases also used
by plaintiff); Day v. Day, (reported at No. 21 in Cox, supra note 79) (injunction restraining use of
infringing labels); Harrison v. Gardner, 2 Madd. 198 (Ch. 1817) (reported at No. 25 in Cox, supra
note 79) (injunction granted to block operation of similar business under similar name); Edmunds
v. Benbow, (reported at No. 33 in Cox, supra note 79) (injunction granted blocking use of similar
name on competing newspaper); Henry v. Price, 1 Leg. Obs. 364 (Ch. 1831) (reported at No. 48 in
Cox, supra note 79) (injunction granted blocking use of similar labels on medicine); Gout v.
Aleploglu, 5 Leg. Obs. 495 (Ch. 1833) (reported at No. 51 in Cox, supra note 79) (injunction granted
blocking use of same mark on watches).
90 Cox, supra note 79. Cox reports considerably more equity cases from this time period, but
as noted above, many of the cases did not involve trademark claims. Based on a review of the
reports of each case, it appears that forty-three equity trademark cases were decided between 1803
and 1849.
The first reported equitable trademark action in the United States courts is Taylorv. Carpenter,
an 1844 circuit court decision by Justice Story of the United States Supreme Court. Story made it
clear that no controversy existed concerning the jurisdiction of equity over a trademark infringement
claim. "I do not quote cases, to establish the principles above stated. They are very familiar to the
profession; and are not now susceptible of any judicial doubt .. " 23 F. Cas. 742, 744 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1844) (No. 13784).
" Cox, supra note 79. Cox reports on twelve actions at law between 1803 and 1849, but only
seven of those cases involved trademark claims.
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public."92 This recognition of the public interest in avoiding confusion quickly
became a mainstay in equity.93
The desire to avoid consumer confusion led the chancellors in equity to depart
from the intentional deception standard of the early common law trademark
action.94 As explained in the preceding section, trademark infringement was
recognized by the common law as action for deceit, and therefore, required proof
of intentional deception by the defendant.9 By the middle of the nineteenth
century, equity had replaced this requirement with a likelihood of confusion
standard.96
92 Hog 8 Ves. Jun. at 226, 32 Eng. Rep. at 340.
9' The decision by Lord Langdale in Pery P. Truefitt, 6 Beav. 66, 1 L.T. 384 (Master Rolls 1842)
(reported at No. 73 in Cox, supra note 79), provides a good example of this shift. Notice how
Langdale's explanation of the "principle" at issue resembles modem courts' concern over consumer
confusion.
I think that the principle on which both the Courts of law and of Equity
proceed, in granting relief and protection in cases of this sort, is very well
understood. A man is not to sell his own goods under the pretence that they are
the goods of another man ; he cannot be permitted to practise such a deception,
nor to use the means which contribute to that end. He cannot therefore be
allowed to use names, marks, letters, or other indicia, by which he may induce
purchasers to believe, that the goods which he is selling are the manufacture of
another person.
Id. Though Langdale states that the law and equity courts relied upon the same principle, his strong
statements that one "cannot be permitted" and "cannot, therefore, be allowed" reflect equity's
power to grant injunctions. The underlying principle may have been the same, but equity was
beginning to apply that principle in a more flexible way than the common laws did. See also
Edelstein v. Edelsten, 1 De. G.J. & S. 185, 199, 46 Eng. Rep. 78 (Ch. 1863) ("[l]t is not necessary
for the injunction to prove fraud in the defendant. .. .
Equity courts in the United States took the same approach. "It would seem that an
intentional fraud is not necessary to entitle the plaintiff to protection; but that where ... the
spurious article cannot be distinguished from the genuine one, an injunction will be granted .. "
Coffeen v. Brunton, 5 F. Cas. 1184, 1185 (C.C.D. Ind. 1849) (No. 2947); see also BROWNE, supra
note 57, § 468 ("In equity, if the defendant, without fraud, use the trade-mark of the complainant,
he is still liable.");James M. Koelemay,Jr., Monetary Refieffor Trademark Infinngement Under the Lanbam
Act, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 458, 473 (1982).
" One of the leading American trademark cases of the early period held "that an injunction
must be granted whenever the public is in fact misled, whether intentionally or otherwise . .."
Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sand. 599,606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849). The Amoskeag court, however,
also explained that one who copies another's trademark commits a fraud on the public, and it is not
clear whether the court viewed the infringement in that case as willful or not. Id. at 605--06.
9 See supra notes 60-79 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Millington v. Fox, 3 Myl. & Cr. 338, 352-53, 40 Eng. Rep. 956, 961-62 (Ch. 1838)
("In short, it does not appear to me that there was any fraudulent intention in the use of the marks.
That circumstance, however, does not deprive the Plaintiffs of their right to the exclusive use of
those names."); Shrimpton v. Laight, 18 Beav. 164, 164, 52 Eng. Rep. 65, 65 (Master Rolls 1854)
(describing standard as "whether the public.., would probably be deceived"). Earlier cases seemed
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The chancellors, however, moved cautiously during this period. Injunctions
were granted only where the plaintiff's claim of right seemed clear.9" There are
several reported instances of a chancellor refusing to grant an injunction, and
instead directing the plaintiff to bring an action at law to establish its right to
relief.9" There are few reported cases where this process was used successfully by
the trademark owner, though it required at least a three-step process before a
permanent injunction would issue."
to rely on a confusion standard, too, but none were as clear in their finding of no deceptive intent.
See, e.g., Archbold v. Sweet, 1 M. & Rob. 162, 5 C. & P. 219 (Nisi Prius 1832) (reported at No. 49
in Cox, supra note 79) (asking whether defendant's work "would be understood by purchasers to
be by the plaintiff," but identifying the case as a copyright action); Ransome v. Bentall, 3 L.J. Ch.
N.S. 161 (Ch. 1833) (reported at No. 53 in Cox, supra note 79) (granting an injunction because it
was possible that some uses by the defendant "may have the effect of misleading persons"); Knott
v. Morgan, 2 Keen 213 (Master of Rolls 1836) (reported at No. 57 in Cox, supra note 79) (enjoining
defendant from "attracting custom on the false representation that carriages, really the defendant's,
belong to and are under the management of the plaintiffs").
17 See, e.g., Martin v. Wright, 6 Sire. 297 (Ch. 1833) (reported at No. 52 in Cox, supra note 79)
(injunction refused because Chancellor was not persuaded of plaintiff's injury); Snowden v. Noah, 1
Hopkins Ch. 347 (N.Y. Ch. 1825) (reported at No. 41 in COX, supra note 79) (injunctions refused
because newspapers names-The National Advocate and The New York NationalAdvocate--"were
sufficiently distinct to prevent deception') (quotation from Cox); Canham v. Jones, 2 V. & B. 218
(Ch. 1813) (reported at No. 19 in Cox, supra note 79) (injunction refused where plaintiff's claim
could be presented as a contract matter); Cruttwell v. Lye, 17 Vesey Rep. 335, 1 Rose 123 (Ch. 1810)
(reported at No. 17 in Cox, supra note 79) (injunction refused despite uses of identical trade name
for identical businesses).
These early cases show both a reluctance to intervene and a willingness to allow simultaneous
uses of the same or similar trade names. Indeed, it appears that prior to the nineteenth century it
was common for shops to operate in the same city with very similar trade names and signs. See
SCHECHTER, supra note 57, at 134-35 n.6.
9s Pidding v. How, 8 Sim. 477 (Ch. 1837) (reported at No. 60 in Cox, supra note 79) (injunction
refused until plaintiff established its right to relief at law); Motley v. Downman, 3 My. & Cr. 1
(Ch. 1837) (reported at No. 61 in Cox, supra note 79) (existing injunction dissolved because a
substantial question was raised concerning plaintiff's right to relief; plaintiff given liberty to bring
an action at law to establish its right to relief); Spottiswoode v. Clarke, 2 Ph. 154, 1 Coop. 254
(Ch. 1846) (reported at No. 85 in Cox, supra note 79) (injunction dissolved, but defendant ordered
to keep an account until an action at law was concluded); Purser v. Brain, 17 L.J. Ch. 141 (Ch. 1848)
(reported at No. 92 in Cox, supra note 79) (injunction dissolved in case involving almost identical
trademarks because question raised about plaintiff's rights to the mark; the Chancellor held that the
issue should be resolved by a jury in an action at law); Foot v. Lea, 13 It. Eq. 484 (Ch. It. 1850)
(reported at No. 107 in Cox, supra note 79) (injunction denied because an action at law was needed
to determine whether the marks were sufficiently similar); Merrimack Mfg. Co. v. Gamer, 2 Abb.
Pr. 318 (N.Y. Ch. 1855) (reported at No. 134 in Cox, smpra note 79) (injunction refused because
infringement was not clear without a trial at law).
9 See, e.g., Turner v. Evans, 2 De. G., M. & G. 740 (Ch. 1853) (injunction refused until after a
trial at law); 2 E. & B. 512 (Queen's Bench 1853) (verdict returned in favor of plaintiff). These
proceedings are reported at No. 114 in Cox, supra note 79, where it is noted that an injunction was
granted after the plaintiff's successful action at law. In Farina v. Silverlock, 1 K. & J. 509, 69 Eng.
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This interplay between the law and equity courts may help explain a somewhat
surprising fact from the early period. Accountings were very seldom ordered in
the early equity actions. Though Hogg v. Kirby endorsed this remedy, it was not
until 1861 that the first accounting was ordered in a reported trademark case in
equity."° What did trademark owners do if they obtained an injunction, but no
accounting? The reports don't answer this question, but it is quite plausible that
at least some plaintiffs obtained damages in an action at law brought before or
after the infringement was enjoined.
3. Equity and theAccounling ofDefendant's Profits. Equity intervened in trademark
law because of the need for injunctive relief to stop an infringement, not because
the common law damages remedy was unable to provide adequate compensation.
A number of equity cases from the early period show that chancellors felt some
issues should be resolved by juries in trials at law.'0 ' In theory at least, the
combination of the injunction, granted in equity, and damages, granted at law,
would provide complete relief. In practice, however, there were two problems
with this approach.
First, the common law process did not entitle plaintiff to discovery from the
defendant. That surely left many trademark owners unable to quantify their losses.
In addition, determining the actual monetary impact of trademark infringement
is inherently impossible, because part of the injury is the damage done to the
plaintiff's reputation. This type of injury is real, but cannot be accurately
quantified. For these reasons, the damages remedy provided in early common law
trademark actions was unlikely to provide adequate compensation.
The second problem with the dual trademark action approach-that is, one
action in the equity court and another in the law court-was the inherent
inefficiency of such a procedure. Over time, equity developed a "general principle
Rep. 560 (Ch. 1855), the plaintiff initially received an injunction from a Vice Chancellor. The matter
was appealed and the Lord Chancellor dissolved the injunction because the allegedly infringing
labels made by defendant could be used for a proper purpose. Plaintiff was given liberty to bring
an action at law. Farina v. Silverlock, 25 L.J. Ch. 11 (1856). The plaintiff brought an action at law
in the Queen's Bench court and prevailed. Farina v. Silverlock, 30 L.T. 242 (Q.B. 1858). Finally,
plaintiff returned to equity, where an injunction was granted. Farina v. Silverlock, 4 K. & J. 650
(Ch. 1858).
One of the leading early American trademark cases of the nineteenth century seems to have
proceeded in the opposite sequence. In Taylorv. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844), the
plaintiff obtained an injunction. The plaintiff then proceeded to trial on its common law claim,
prevailed, and obtained a damages award. Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 744 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846).
In another action involving the same parties, the plaintiff obtained an injunction from a New York
equity court. Taylor v. Carpenter, 2 Sand. Ch. 603 (N.Y. Ch. 1846).
1m Dent v. Turpin, 2J. & H. 139, 30 L.J. Ch. 495 (Ch. 1861) (reported at No. 196 in Cox, supra
note 79).
11 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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against multiplicity of suits,' 1 2 a development that likely led to the increased use
of the accounting remedy in trademark cases. After all, the trademark action in
equity was essential because of the need for an injunction. The action at law
served a limited purpose if an equity court already had considered the merits of
the claim. Though it took some time to become widely accepted, by the end of
the early period, the accounting remedy was the preferred monetary remedy in
trademark cases. 3
There is another important point concerning the accounting remedy during the
early period. In determining whether to award an accounting of defendant's profits,
the equity courts of the early period used the same deceit standard used in the early
common law actions seeking damages. The chancellors viewed an award of
defendant's profits as equity's alternative to common law damages. °4 Because
deceptive intent was required to obtain damages in a common law trademark
action,' the chancellors imposed the same requirement on trademark owners
seeking monetary relief in equity (i.e., accountings of defendant's profits).16
102 Devlin, supra note 72, at 1573. The author described the problems of the dual approach as
follows:
In many, perhaps most, of these cases the Chancellor could have granted the
relief sought without interfering with the trial of the main point by a jury at
common law .... On occasions this is what the Chancellor did. But in general,
he found, as we still find today, that most cases cannot be split between courts
without the certainty of additional expense and the risk of injustice.
Id. "[T]he notion developed that if a ground for equitable relief existed, equity would not stop with
the granting of equitable relief but would (at least if plaintiff wished) decide all aspects of the
controversy, and this would often include issues which were ordinarily for the law courts." Fleming
James, Jr., Right to aJug Trial in CivilAcions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 658-59 (1963).
103 Koelemay, supra note 93, at 466 ("By the time the United States Congress enacted the first
federal trademark statute in 1870, an accounting of the defendant's profits was the primary
pecuniary remedy sought by trademark owners and awarded by the courts, the action at law for
damages being little used.") (citation omitted).
104 "The principle is that equity converts the infringer into a trustee as to the profits, a principle
appropriate in equity by reference to a master, who can examine books and papers and examine the
infringer and his employees on oath." 2 STORY, supra note 72, 5 1262 n.3 (discussing the
defendant's profits award in patent cases); see also Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 148 (1888)
(accounting was "an equivalent or a substitute for legal damages"); Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. Jun.
at 223, 32 Eng. Rep. at 339; Devlin, supra note 72, at 1624 (discussing accountings in equity).
10' See, e.g., Crawshay v. Thompson, 4 Man. & G. 357, 134 Eng. Rep. 146 (C.P. 1842) (relief
denied because plaintiff failed to prove fraudulent intent by defendant). There were, however, some
actions at law during the early period that are less clear as to whether deceptive intent must be
proven. See, e.g., Davis v. Kendall, 2 R.I. 566, 566 (1850) (describing the standard in an action at law
as whether defendant's label was "so like the plaintiff's as to mislead the public').
106 See, e.g., Cartier v. Carlile, 31 Beav. 292, 297, 54 Eng. Rep. 1151, 1153 (1862) (in opposing the
plaintiff's request for an accounting, defendants argued the plaintiff "cannot recover at law [because
there was no proof of fraud, so] he ought not to recover in equity."); Koelemay, supra note 93,
at 467 ("[ln accord with the maxim aequitas seguitur legem ('equity follows the law'), the
24
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Given the clear separation of the law and equity courts during this period, it
is easy to appreciate the distinct nature of common law damages and equitable
accountings. These were alternative remedies. The accounting was provided in
equity to replace a damages award in order to eliminate the need for a separate
action at law for damages. It follows, therefore, that if the plaintiff obtained an
award of damages in an action at law, equity would not provide an accounting of
defendant's profits. It was not possible to obtain actual damages and defendant's
profits in a single case during the early period.
4. Puniive Damages Were Not Granted. There is almost no mention of punitive
damages during the early period. This is not particularly surprising given the
nature of the early common law trademark action. A plaintiff had to prove
intentional deception to recover actual damages. What more could a plaintiff
prove to justify punitive damages? Only one early period case was found that
mentioned punitive relief, and the court rejected the claim."7
B. THE MIDDLE PERIOD (1870-1905)
The remedial scheme that developed during the early period was relatively
clear. Unfortunately, that clarity began to break down in the middle period.
Equity courts began to award both damages and profits, sometimes in the same
case. The substantive standards for obtaining monetary relief also became less
clear during this period. On the other hand, courts during this period consistently
held that injunctions would be granted more liberally than would money remedies.
Finally, courts began to signal their willingness to grant punitive damages during
the middle period. These changes are reviewed in the following sections.
1. Damages-No LongerJust a 'Legal" Remedy. One of the most striking changes
of the middle period was an apparently abrupt shift by the equity courts. During
the early period, equity courts explained that accountings were equity's alternative
to damages. 8 A wall seemed to separate the monetary remedies proved in the law
and equity courts. That changed during the middle period, as equity courts in
chancellors refused to award an accounting of profits against innocent infringers and required
showings of fraudulent intent.").
"I Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742, 751 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844). The court noted that if
evidence were presented of "a known and deliberate imitation, often renewed and very prejudicial
to the plaintiffs," the jury would "not be very nice in their data and inferences." Id. But the court
ruled that "smart money" or "vindictive damages" could not be awarded. Id
108 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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England and the United States began to grant damages in trademark cases.' °9 Why
did this change happen?
One factor that contributed to this change came from England. Parliament
passed Lord Cairn's Act in 1858, a law that authorized the English equity courts
to award damages."' United States courts relied heavily on English trademark
cases during the nineteenth century, so this change in English equity practice
surely had an impact on the practices in equity courts in the United States. The
first reported English trademark case in equity to award both profits and damages
was decided in 1865."' The first such case in the United States came in 1867.12
Another factor was the enactment in 1870 of a sweeping new intellectual
property statute in the United States. The legislation was tided "An Act [t]o
revise, consolidate, and amend the Statutes relating to Patents and Copyrights,""' 3
but it also included the first federal trademark laws." 4 The statute established a
trademark registration system and created federal trademark actions for
infringement of registered marks. The owner of a registered mark could bring "an
action in the case for damages,"' 5 and "shall also have his remedy according to
the course of equity to enjoin the wrongful use of his trade-mark and to recover
compensation ... "11'
Ironically, it was a change to patent law remedies that may have had the most
impact on trademark practices during the middle period. Under the patent law
provisions of the 1870 Act, federal courts, sitting in equity, were authorized to
award injunctions, damages, andprofits." 7 This was an important change, because
109 See Graveley v. Winchester, (Ch. 1867) (reported at No. 272 in Cox, supra note 79); Gillott
v. Esterbrook, 47 Barb. 455 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1867); Leather Cloth Co. v. Hirschfeld, 1 Eq. 299 (Ch.
1865) (granting an injunction and directing an inquiry into plaintiff's damages; no damages were
awarded because plaintiff failed to prove its damages).
110 21 & 22 Vic., ch. 27, § 2 (1858).
Southorn v. Reynolds, 12 L.T.N.S. 75 (Ch. 1865).
n2 Gillott v. Esterbrook, 47 Barb. 455 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1867), aft'd, 48 N.Y. 374 (N.Y. 1872).
It is possible that the lower court misused the term damages, and that the actual relief was an
accounting of defendant's profits. One commentator has opined that this type of error may explain
the reported equity cases that mention "damages." Koelemay, supra note 93, at 464-65. There is
no way to be sure of what happened in Gillott, but it is clear that subsequent equity cases awarded
both damages and profits. See infra notes 118-27.
13 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217.
114 Id % 77-84. The trademark provisions of the 1870 Act included a fundamental change to
the law of trademarks, with trademark rights being created by registration. Use was not required
to register a trademark under the 1870 Act. Id § 77.
115 Id § 79.
116 Id
117 Id 55.
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earlier patent statutes had required patent owners to elect either damages or
profits, but not both."8 The 1870 Act allowed recovery of both.
The trademark provisions of the 1870 Act authorized equity courts to provide
"compensation" in trademark cases, but said nothing about what form such
compensation should take. With both English trademark actions and U.S. patent
actions allowing recovery of damages and profits in equity, it was probably a small
step for the U.S. courts to do the same in trademark cases. Damages are a form
of "compensation," so this shift was, at least arguably, within the scope of the
statutory text of the 1870 Act's trademark remedy provision. 9
Whatever the reasons, the result was clear. Equity courts in the United States
began awarding damages in trademark cases during the middle period. For
example, in Wolfe v. Barnett,12° the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a lower court
"R See, e.g., Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126,138 (1877) (noting that an equity court could
not award damages and profits in patent case brought prior to Patent Act of 1870).
"9 The 1870 Act's trademark provisions were short-lived. They were struck down by the United
States Supreme Court in the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). The Court also invalidated
an 1876 Act that criminalized trademark counterfeiting.
Two arguments were made in support of the new federal trademark laws. First, the United
States argued the patent and copyright clause of the Constitution authorized the new federal
trademark laws. Id. at 93-94. This clause authorizes Congress to pass laws "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The
Court quickly rejected this argument, noting that a trademark is neither an invention nor a creative
work. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
The second potential source of congressional power identified by the United States was the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 95. This grant of power was a closer fit, but the actual
legislation ultimately went beyond Congress' regulatory power, because it applied to all commerce.
Id. at 95-96 ("WThere still remains a very large amount of commerce, perhaps the largest, which,
being trade or traffic between citizens of the same State, is beyond the control of Congress.").
The Supreme Court also took a rather dim view of Congress' tinkering with the existing
trademark rules. One can hardly help but get the sense that the Court was telling Congress that it
ought to leave well enough alone.
The tight to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or
property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use
by all other persons, has been long recognized by the common law and the
chancery courts of England and of this country, and by the statutes of some of
the States. It is a property right for the violation of which damages may be
recovered in an action at law, and the continued violation of it will be enjoined
by a court of equity, with compensation for past infringement. This exclusive
right was not created by the act of Congress, and does not now depend upon it
for its enforcement. The whole system of trade-mark property and the civil
remedies for its protection existed long anterior to that act, and have remained
in full force since its passage.
Id. at 92.
'20 24 La. Ann. 97 (La. 1872).
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decision that granted a limited injunction, but denied the plaintiffs claim for
damages. Finding the plaintiff "entitled to a perpetuation of the injunction
originally issued and to damages," the court directed the trial court to award
$1,500 in damages to plaintiff.'2' This clearly was a damages award, and not an
accounting of defendant's profits."
Another illustrative case is Collins Co. v. Oliver Ames & Sons Corp.' 3 The
plaintiff was a respected maker of "axes and other edge-tools" that bore the
trademark "Collins & Co."'24 Defendant engaged in a similar business, making
"shovels, spades, scoops, and other similar implements and tools."'2 5 Defendant's
agent received a large order from Australia for Collins & Co. shovels. The
defendant filled the order with its own shovels, but marked them with the
plaintiffs Collins & Co. trademark. The markings on the shovels also identified
the city and state in which defendant operated, not the city and state of the
plaintiff. In the litigation, the defendant argued that the accurate location
information on the shovels was enough to avoid infringement. The court
disagreed and awarded damages and defendant's profits. 6
By the end of the middle period, some courts treated this issue as resolved.
For example, one court said:
The rule which now prevails in the equity courts, respecting the
wrongdoer's accountability for the "profits and damages" resulting
from his unlawful acts, requires the master, not only to take an
account of all profits made by the defendant, but also to make an
121 Id. at 98.
12 It was, however, an odd damages award. The case contains no mention whatsoever of the
volume of defendant's sale or of his profits. Nor does the case discuss the amount of plaintiff's
losses. The Louisiana Supreme Court simply stated, "[w]e fix the damages in this case at $1500,"
and gave no explanation whatsoever. Id.
123 18 F. 561 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882).
124 Id. at 562.
2 Id. at 563.
126 Id. at 570-71. This award was striking for two reasons. First, it illustrates the willingness of
some equity courts to grant damages. But it is also noteworthy given the facts. The plaintiff did
not make shovels, and the infringing shovels made by defendant were sold outside the United
States. Both of these facts could have had a bearing on the plaintiff's right to relief. The court,
however, was not persuaded. It ordered the defendant to pay over to plaintiff the entire profit
obtained from the infringing sales, despite the fact that plaintiff apparently could not have filled the
order if it had wished to do so. Id
It is quite possible the plaintiff did not ultimately obtain both damages and profits. The
matter was referred to a master "for an accounting ... as to profits and damages." It is hard to
imagine what damages the plaintiff could establish given the facts. Nevertheless, the court's decree
expressly authorized an award of both "profits and damages." Id at 571.
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inquiry in regard to all damages sustained by the plaintiff on account
of the defendant's wrongful acts .... 127
There are other equity cases from the period that reach this conclusion (i.e., that
profits and damages are to be granted),121 and there are equity cases that award
damages, but not profits. 9
With equity courts granting damages, a new issue arose. What is the difference
between damages and profits? This question did not arise during the early period,
because these two remedies were never available in the same action. Once that
changed, some courts struggled to clearly distinguish between the remedies. A
good example is found in a case decided by the Florida Supreme Court.
That a man whose trade-marks have been infringed upon, as in this
case, is entitled to compensation for the infringement, is
unquestionable; and it strikes us that it makes no difference whether
the compensation to which the complainant is entitled is called
'profits' or 'damages.' What is an accounting, but the method by
which to ascertain the complainant's damages or compensation for
the wrong and injury done him by the defendants?"'"
The court continued, "a party whose trade-mark has been violated is entitled to
recover all the profits realized by the wrong-doer from sales of the spurious article,
and also all damages resulting from such violation.' '131 After providing this
"helpful" explanation, the court "remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion."'32 Similar confusion can be found in other cases from this
period.
133
127 W.R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co., 62 A. 499, 506-07 (Me. 1905).
125 See, e.g., Benkert v. Feder, 34 F. 534 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1888).
129 The case of Faberv. Hove,, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1875) (reported at No. 481 in Cox, supra note 79),
aftd, 73 N.Y. 592 (N.Y. Crt. App. 1878), provides a good example. The case involved the well-
known maker of lead-pencils. An injunction was granted and the case sent to a referee to determine
plaintiffs damages. The court approved the referee's assessment, holding "the damages were equal
to the profits which the plaintiff would have made from the manufacture and sale of the same
number of articles as the defendant had sold under the spurious mark." Id. One can question
whether a one-to-one relationship between sales of counterfeit goods and sales of authentic goods
is an accurate measure of a plaintiff's losses, but it is beyond question that the court here awarded
damages, not defendant's profits. See also Hostetter v. Vowinkle, 12 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.D. Neb. 1871)
(same).
3 El Modelo Cigar Mfg. Co. v. Gato, 7 So. 23, 28 (Fla. 1890).
131 Id.
132 Id.
131 In Atlanic Mil'ng Co. v. Rowland, 27 F. 24 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886), the court ordered an
accounting of "profits" to be based on the volume of defendant's sales multiplied by the plaintiff's
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Some equity courts during the middle period refused to grant both profits and
damages. As one court explained, a "plaintiff is not entitled.. . 'to an account of
profits, and also an inquiry as to damages.' "" Despite the equity court's
authority to award damages, this court held that plaintiff had to choose between
the two remedies: "'You may elect to claim such damages as you have sustained,
or take an account of profits.' 35
The damages remedy became more common during the middle period, largely
because this remedy was available in the same suit needed to obtain an injunction.
Unfortunately, the cases from this period are not clear about what showing was
required to obtain damages. There were a few reasons for this result. First, most
trademark cases from this period simply lack detailed discussions of remedies.
Second, many cases refer to damages and profits together, making it impossible
to determine whether the same or a different substantive requirement existed for
the two remedies. Third, courts from this period were quick to find fraudulent
intent, especially when a technical trademark was copied. Once a court has found
deceptive intent, there is little reason to discuss what the outcome might have
been had the defendant acted innocently. The end result is ambiguity, though
there were some subtle signs that courts were shifting the focus of the damages
inquiry from the defendant's bad faith to the plaintiffs injury.' 36
profit margin. Such a calculation is a measure of plaintiff's damages, not defendant's profits, thus
further illustrating the level of confusion in the courts during this period. See also Graham v. Plate,
40 Cal. 593, 598 (1871) ("It is evident that the profit realized by the wrong-doer is not the on#
measure of damages.").
Even leading commentators of this era seemed to confuse the two monetary remedies.
Consider the following explanation from a leading treatise: "The proper measure of damages, in
case of violation of a trade-mark, is generally the profit realized upon the sales of goods to which
the spurious marks were attached. The actual damages for the infringement would seem, as a
general rule, to be all that could be reasonably claimed." BROWNE, smpra note 57, 5 503.
'3' Avery v. Meikle, 3 S.W. 609, 613 (Ky. 1887).
135 Id. The separation of the legal and equitable remedies was also noted in a common law case
from this period. Addington v. Cullinane, 28 Mo. App. 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1887). The court held
that using defendant's profits as a measure of plaintiff's damages was improper, because "in a
common-law action for damages, in cases of this class, such a method of arriving at the plaintiffs'
rights has never been sanctioned." Id. at 241. The court noted that accountings of defendant's
profits were appropriate in trademark actions in equity. Id.
136 It is difficult to be sure what rule courts were using during this period, because courts found
intentional deception in most of the cases where relief was granted. In other cases, deceptive intent
was strongly implied. For example, in Woffe v. Bamett, 24 La. Ann. 97 (La. 1872), the court
concluded that defendant's "excuse" of having someone's permission to use the plaintiff's
trademark was not credible. Id. at 99-100.
It is, however, clear that courts were using a likelihood of confusion standard to determine
whether to grant injunctions, and that equity courts were often granting injunctions and damages
by the end of the middle period. This fact, combined with the fact that a number of cases from this
period are not clear about the showing required to obtain damages, suggests that, at a minimum,
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2. Defendant'sProfits-WaslntentSillRequired? The showing required to obtain
an accounting of defendant's profits became somewhat less clear during the
middle period. The majority of equity courts continued to adhere to the intent
requirement established during the early period of trademark law.'37 For example,
in an equity case involving the intentional passing off of an inferior product as
Hennessy brandy, a court concluded that aggravated circumstances were required
to obtain monetary relief.'38 The court was satisfied that plaintiff had carried this
burden, and therefore, awarded both profits and damages.'39 Though there was
"some conflict in the decisions," the weight of authority by the end of the middle
period was "in favor of the rule that an account of profits will not be taken where
the wrongful use of a trade-mark or a tradename has been merely accidental or
without any actual wrongful intent to defraud a plaintiff or to deceive the
public."'
4
There were, however, exceptions. One court held "the case may go to a
master for an account of gains and profits, on account of the unauthorized,
though not intentional and fraudulent, use by respondents ... ,,14' No other cases
were found that went this far, but there are other cases from this period that
suggest ptofits could be obtained without proof of intent.
142
courts were beginning to move away from the fraud of the early common law cases.
A good example of a case suggesting this shift began during the middle period is Amoskeag
Manufacturing Co. v. Garner, 4 Am. L.T.N.S. 176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876) (reported at No. 500 in Cox,
supra note 79). The court held that defendant's intent was immaterial on the issue of whether an
injunction should issue. The court also held that no damages or profits would be awarded because
plaintiff delayed bringing the action. The latter holding suggests that if the action had been timely,
monetary relief would have been awarded, even though fraudulent intent was not established. See
also Faber v. D'Utassey, 11 Abb. Pr. N.S. 399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871) (reported at No. 355 in Cox,
supra note 79) (holding that a defendant's lack of knowledge of plaintiff's ownership of the mark
might not be a defense). There is one case from the early period that also seems to indicate some
relaxation of the fraud requirement. See Davis v. Kendall, 2 R.I. 566, 566 (R.I. 1850) (holding that
the key issue in an action at law was defendant's mark was "so like the plaintiff's as to mislead the
public").
"' See, e.g., Wharton v. Thurber, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1879) (discussed at No. 663 in Cox, supra
note 79) (where "defendants inadvertently employed the [plaintiff's] designation," an injunction was
granted, but accounting denied); Weed v. Peterson, 12 Abb. Pr. N.S. 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872)
(reported at No. 387 in Cox, supra note 79) (infringement was unintentional; injunction granted, but
no monetary relief awarded).
13s Hennessy v. Wilmerding-Loewe Co., 103 F. 90, 94 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
139 Id. at 94-96.
"4 Regis v. Jaynes, 77 N.E. 774, 776 (Mass. 1906).
'4 Oakes v. Tonsmierre, 49 F. 447,453 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1883).
142 Stonebraker v. Stonebraker, 33 Md. 252 (Md. 1870) provides a good example. The court found
"an evident purpose to deceive," based on the defendant's actions. Id at 268. Despite this finding,
the court also asserted that an injunction and accounting would be awarded "even where it does not
appear there was any fraudulent intent .... " Id See also Hostetter v. Vowinlde, 12 F. Cas. 546
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One other issue concerning the accounting remedy arose during this period.
The question was how profits should be calculated, and specifically, whether the
profits to be awarded were limited to those proven to be attributable to
defendant's use of the infringing trademark. Some defendants argued plaintiff had
the burden of proving what portion of the defendant's profits were attributable
to the trademark, as compared to the market demand for the article itself.'"
Courts uniformly rejected this argument, as illustrated by the following excerpt
from a decision by the California Supreme Court:
[E]very consideration of reason, justice and sound policy, demands
that one who fraudulently uses the trade-mark of another should not
be allowed to shield himself from liability for the profit he has made
by the use of the trade-mark, on the plea that it is impossible to
determine how much of the profit is due to the trade-mark, and how
much to the intrinsic value of the commodity.'
3. Injunctions-Equitable Prindples Take Center Stage. The middle period also saw
an increasing emphasis on equitable principles, particularly in cases where
defendants challenged a prevailing plaintiff's right to an injunction. During this
period, it became clear that injunctions in trademark cases were based, in part, on
the public interest, and for that reason, injunctions were granted even when the
equities did not clearly favor the plaintiff. The leading cases on this point came
from the United States Supreme Court. The first case, McLean v. Fleming,'45 dealt
with the equitable defense of laches. The Court held that a laches defense may bar
recovery of monetary relief, but rarely will bar an injunction.146 The second
(C.C.D. Neb. 1871) (awarding damages and an injunction after stating that a likelihood of confusion
is sufficient to establish infringement; it seems clear from the decision, however, that the court
believed the defendant acted with deceptive intent).
143 See Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 138 F. 22 (2d Cir. 1905); Benkert v. Feder, 34
F. 534 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1888).
144 Graham v. Plate, 40 Cal. 593, 599 (1871). The case involved counterfeit Derringer pistols
sold in California. The defendant argued that plaintiff had never sold its pistols in California, and
therefore had no trademark rights in California. The Derringer brand, however, was well known
throughout the country, and the California court was not receptive to the defendant's arguments.
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403,418 (1916) (explaining that Derringer's pistol was
on sale in San Francisco, and that was why defendant had adopted the same trademark).
141 96 U.S. 245 (1877).
146 It is not at all clear what the monetary remedy was in this case. The district court referred
the matter "to a master, to compute the amount of the gains and profits." Id. at 248. The Supreme
Court referred to the defendant's challenge "to a decree for gains, profits, or damages." Id. at 256.
In the end, all that is clear on this point is that the Supreme Court vacated the monetary award in
its entirety. Id. at 257-58.
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Supreme Court case, MenendeZ v. Holt,47 presented essentially the same issue and,
not surprisingly, reached the same result."4
Why the distinction between injunctions and monetary remedies? One of the
best explanations from this period is found, ironically, in the arguments by counsel
for Menendez to the Supreme Court:
We feel satisfied that, in the light of these numerous authorities, the
question of laches as between the interest of private litigants is one
proper to be raised by defendant, and will avail him if the charge is
proven. McLean v. Fleming seems to mark the distinction that where
the general public is interested as a third party, and where it appears
that the public will be injured by the false representations of the
defendant, the question of laches will be pertinent only so far as
complainants' right to an accounting is concerned; the injunction
being, however, granted, not because complainant is in an equitable
position, but because the public, and the public only, has to be
protected. 49
This explanation seems to capture the underlying principles of both McLean and
MenendeZ. It shows why the injunction was treated differently than monetary
remedies in trademark cases. There was a third interest at stake-the public
interest in being protected from confusion in the market-and that interest shifted
the equitable balance in favor of granting injunctions. The same could not be said
of monetary remedies.
There were, however, a substantial number of cases from this period where
courts denied all relief based on the equitable defense of unclean hands. These
cases typically involved a plaintiff who made serious misrepresentations to the
public about its goods. A somewhat common storyline involved disputes over
"medicinal" products. In the typical dispute, plaintiff used a particular trademark
and trade dress for its "medicine" and achieved some degree of success in the
market."5 In achieving that success, the plaintiff made certain misrepresentations
147 128 U.S. 514 (1888). The Court again did little to clarify what monetary remedy or remedies
were involved. At one point the Court refers to "an account of gains and profits," and at another
to "damages." Id. at 523, 524.
141 Id. at 524; see also Julian v. Hoosier Drill Co., 78 Ind. 408 (1881) (a delay in bringing suit
blocked a claim for damages, but would not bar an injunction).
149 128 U.S. at 519 (1888) (arguments of counsel for appellant). This argument was an honest
characterization of the relevant principles, but it did not seem to help the appellant, who was trying
to convince the Supreme Court to bar all relief. Appellant's counsel went on to argue that there was
no public interest in an injunction in the MenendeZ case because of allegedly widespread third party
use of the plaintiffs trademark. Id.
" See, e.g., Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218, 222 (1883) (holding that a "court
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to purchasers, for example, that the product had some actual medicinal value.' 51
Courts tended to deny all relief to the plaintiffs in these cases.'
15 2
Is there an inconsistency between the cases barring all relief in equity due to
misrepresentations by the plaintiff (e.g., the questionable medicine cases described
above) and the McLean and Menende.Z decisions that allowed injunctions to issue
despite laches by plaintiffs? At a superficial level, it appears these results are
inconsistent, because one equitable defense (unclean hands) barred all relief, while
another equitable defense (laches) did not. But upon closer examination, there is
a common thread that runs through both groups of cases: the public interest in
preventing deception of consumers. In the unclean hands cases, the courts
refused to aid a plaintiff who had made serious, and potentially harmful,
of equity will extend no aid" to a plaintiff who has made misrepresentations to the public about its
own goods); A.N. Chamberlain Medicine Co. v. H.A. Chamberlain Medicine Co., 86 N.E. 1025,
1026-27 (Ind. App. 1909) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's trademark claims because of the gross
misrepresentations plaintiff made about its own product and citing several other cases to the same
effect).
151 The Chamberlain Mediine case cited above provides a good example of such
misrepresentations. The plaintiff developed its medicine in 1850 and sold it under the name "A.N.
Chamberlain's Immediate Relief." 86 N.E. at 1026. In promoting this "medicine," plaintiff claimed
it cured the following maladies:
Eczema or yellow fever, Asiatic cholera in its first stages or chilblains, catarrh or
seasickness, diphtheria or pimples, cholera morbus or bee stings, bites of
poisonous reptiles or piles, dysentery or scratches on horses, scarlet fever or
sour stomach, measles or cramps, neuralgia or general debility, hysterics or hog
cholera, la grippe or bloat and scours in horses, cattle and sheep, diarrhoea or
itching and eruptions, bilious fever or wind galls on horses, bloody flux or sick
headache, fever and ague or heaves in horses, colic or toothache, spotted fever
or nervous tremors, sore throat or chicken cholera, cold feet or scalds and
bums, rheumatism or earache, dumb ague or cuts and bruises, colds or summer
complaint, coughs or colic in man or beast, griping pains or nervous headache,
sprains and wounds or diseases of young lambs.
86 N.E. at 1026. The court clearly was disturbed by such claims, but the plaintiff did not stop with
this impressive list of problems its medicine allegedly cured. Plaintiff expressly promoted its
medicine as a cure for diptheria, a potentially fatal disease that was somewhat common during this
period. It was this act, more than anything else, that offended the court and justified the dismissal
of plaintiff's trademark claims.
This wanton advice, with reference to this known deadly disease, this reckless
disregard for the consequences on human life, this palpable falsehood, put forth
to deceive distressed, ignorant, and credulous people to their detriment, in cases
of life and death, in order to make a few more sales of this nostrum, is atrocious
and little less than a crime.
86 N.E. at 1026.
152 See supra note 150.
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misrepresentations to consumers. In the laches cases, injunctions were granted
to prevent confusion due to defendant's trademark infringement." 3
The laches cases of this period are important because they highlight the public
interest at stake in trademark cases. That interest justified different rules for
injunctions and monetary remedies. But what about the substantive standards for
obtaining these remedies? The cases discussed above focus on whether an
equitable defense will bar some or all remedies. Does it follow that different
substantive showings should be required for injunctions and monetary remedies?
Injunctions that stop or prevent consumer confusion directly benefit the public,
but monetary payments from one party to another do not." This distinction
could be used to support the use of a different substantive requirement for the
different remedies in trademark cases. The cases from the middle period,
however, do not address this point.
4. Punifive Damages in Trademark Cases. Common law courts began to move
toward approval of punitive damages in trademark cases during the middle period.
Equity courts generally refused to grant punitive relief,' and that may have led
some trademark owners to return to the action at law in the hope of obtaining
punitive damages. We see the first signs of such a move during the middle period,
and then a clear trend during the late period, as will be explained in a later section
of this Article." 6
There is one known trademark case that may have included an award of
punitive damages during this period, but the report is not clear. 7 The trial judge
instructed the jury as follows:
153 It must be pointed out that the unclean hands cases present something of a Hobson's choice.
The decisions cited above dismissed plaintiff's claims because the courts did not want to aid a party
guilty of misleading consumers. But by barring all relief, the courts gave a green light to defendants
and others to use identical trademarks on competing goods, a practice sure to confuse consumers.
Either way, consumers are misled. But by refusing to enforce trademarks being used to mislead
consumers, courts make it harder for the users of such marks to distinguish their products in the
market, which may undermine the entire market for such goods.
154 Monetary remedies can have a deterrent effect, which provides a secondary public benefit.
155 "Where a court of equity has power to award damages, it cannot go beyond compensation;
by applying to such a court, the complainant waived all claim to exemplary damages." 1 SEDGWICK,
A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 727 (9th ed. 1920); see also Tull v. United States, 481
U.S. 412, 422 (1987) ("Remedies intended to punish culpable individuals, as opposed to those
intended simply to extract compensation or restore the status quo, were issued by courts of law, not
courts of equity."); Livingston v. Woodworth, 56 U.S. 546, 559 (1853) ('We are aware of no rule
which converts a court of equity into an instrument for the punishment of simple torts .... ";
AMASA C. PAUL, THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS INCLUDING TRADE-NAMES AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 326 (1903) ("In equity, exemplary (vindictive or punitive) damages will never be
awarded or decreed."); James, supra note 102, at 672 (equity refused to enforce penalties).
156 See infra notes 203-27 and accompanying text.
s Warner v. Roehr, 29 F. Cas. 266 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1884).
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In cases of this character, where you are satisfied from the proof
and from the admissions in the case that the fraud - the intention
to defraud - is at the bottom of the matter, * * * thejugy are not
confined to the exact monetary damages shown by the evidence, but may give
what are known as vindictive or exemplary damagesfor thepurpose of detering
others from embarking in the same scheme offraud or deception.15 8
The jury awarded $2,650.59 It is not clear whether that was an award of actual
damages, exemplary damages, or some combination of the two. All that one can
say with certainty about this case is that the trial judge believed exemplary (i.e.,
punitive) damages were appropriate in "cases of this character."'"
The only other case from the middle period addressing the punitive damages
issue is Henney v. Wilmerding-Loewe Co. 16' The plaintiff argued that it was entitled
to punitive damages because of defendant's intentionally deceptive acts. Plaintiff
cited a copyright case in support of the proposition. 16 The defendant relied upon
Taylor v. Capenter,163 the trademark case from the early period in which the court
refused to award exemplary damages. The court in Hennessy evaluated the parties'
arguments and concluded that punitive damages are available in a trademark
infringement action at law."6
None of this mattered, however, because the Hennessy case was an equity
action. "There does not appear to be any example of a case in equity in which a
master, upon an accounting, has acted as a jury in a case at law, and awarded
punitive damages."' 65 Despite the Hennessy plaintiff s loss on this issue, the case
provided some support, albeit dicta, for the proposition that punitive damages
could be obtained in a trademark action at law.
66
Thus ends the review of the middle period. Much happened in trademark law
during this period. On the positive side, courts began to provide consistent,
coherent explanations for why injunctions were easier to obtain in equity than
158 Id. at 266 (internal ellipsis in original, emphasis added).
159 Id.
166 The entire report consists of the jury instruction on damages and the following statement:
'There was a verdict for twenty-six hundred and fifty dollars, with costs." Id
161 103 F. 90 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
162 Id at 95. The case relied upon by the plaintiff was Pubsbing Co. v. Monroe, 73 F. 196 (2d Cir.
1896). Monroe, the plaintiff, had written a poem for the Chicago World's Fair. The defendant
newspaper printed the poem in its entirety without the plaintiff's permission, despite being warned
of this fact. The case was tried to a jury, and Monroe was awarded $5,000 in exemplary (i.e.,
punitive) damages. Id. at 201.
163 23 F. Cas. 744, 751 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846).
164 Hennessy, 103 F. at 95.
165 Id. at 95-96.
'66 Two later cases addressing the same issue cited Henney as support for the view that punitive
damages are available in trademark cases. See infra notes 219, 227.
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monetary relief. Unfortunately, some confusion and uncertainty developed
concerning the nature of and rules governing money remedies in trademark cases.
C. THE LATE PERIOD (1905-1946)
This period takes us from Congress' second major attempt at a federal
trademark statute'67 (1905) through the passage of the Lanham Act (1946), which
was Congress' last sweeping overhaul of federal trademark law.1 68 The limits of
trademark and unfair competition law were being tested during this period.
Several of the most important cases in the history of trademark law came during
this time. Indeed, this period produced the seminal cases dealing with the
territorial nature of common law trademark rights and trademark dilution (though
the cases did not use that term). The period also saw important developments in
the area of remedies.
The review of the late period follows the same pattern used in prior sections,
with one exception. As in the two preceding sections, damages are considered
first, followed by defendant's profits, injunctions, and, finally, punitive damages.
But the late period presentation does not stop there. In a final section, a new
development is discussed: large monetary awards in trademark cases. Though
such awards were the exception, these awards captured the attention of those
involved in the trademark reform process that led to the Lanham Act.
1. Damages-Disinct from Profits, But Hard To Prove. The late period brought
much needed clarity to the remedial rules in trademark cases. Courts began to
clearly distinguish between the two monetary remedies in trademark cases. The
1905 Trademark Act probably contributed to this change. Unlike the 1870 Act,
which simply stated that a plaintiff may "recover compensation" in equity or
damages at law,169 the 1905 Trademark Act clearly identified and distinguished the
167 There was another federal trademark statute passed in 1881, following the Supreme Court's
invalidation of the 1870 Act. Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502-04 (authorizing the
registration of trade-marks and protecting the same). The 1881 Trademark Act was limited to
commerce with foreign nations and Indian tribes. As these types of commerce were within
Congress' express power to regulate, the fatal flaw of the 1870 Act was avoided.
The 1881 Act dropped perhaps the most sweeping change found in the 1870 Act. Under the
1881 Act, only trademarks actually in use could be registered. This approach has remained a
fundamental aspect of trademark law in the United States to this day.
"5 Some may argue that the 1988 Trademark Law Revision Act (TLRA) was a sweeping change
to federal trademark law. See general#y Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
330, tit. I, § 101, 112 Stat. 3064, 3064; Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667,
tit. I, § 129, 102 Stat. 3935, 3945. The TLRA made important changes to the Lanham Act, but did
not replace it. The Lanham Act completely replaced the 1905 Trademark Act.
169 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 79, 16 Star. 198, 211. Not only was the 1870 Act vague about
the specific remedy or remedies available in equity, the Act identified the remedies at law and in
equity in the same provision.
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profits and damages remedies. 70 In an equity action, a plaintiff could "recover,
in addition to the profits to be accounted for by the defendant, the damages the
complainant has sustained thereby ....
The focus of the damages inquiry shifted from the defendant's bad faith to the
plaintiffs injury. This change is conceptually sound, but was not helpful to
trademark owners, who now faced a difficult challenge:
When a plaintiff in a trade-mark or unfair competition case seeks to
recover damages, the burden is on him to prove by competent and
sufficient evidence his lost sales, or that he was compelled to reduce
prices as the result of his competitor's wrongful conduct. There is
no presumption of law or of fact that a plaintiff would have made
the sales that the defendant made. 2
Few plaintiffs could satisfy this requirement, and the damages remedy became rare
in trademark cases. 73
The late period marked the final departure from the old common law deceit-
based trademark action. Though few cases are explicit on this issue, it seems that
by the end of the late period, plaintiffs no longer had to prove deceptive intent to
recover damages.174 The focus of the damages inquiry was on the plaintiffs injury,
not the defendant's culpability.
175
170 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, §§ 16, 19, 33 Star. 724, 728, 729.
171 I. § 19. The section describing the action at law identified only damages, but did authorize
courts to increase damages by up to three times. Id. § 16.
In an ironic twist, the text quoted above appears to have been borrowed direcdy from the
1870 Act's patent provisions. Language identical to that found in § 19 of the 1905 Trademark Act
is found in § 55 of the 1870 Act, the provision identifying the remedies a patent owner could obtain
in equity. This borrowing is ironic because courts during the middle period seemed to have been
doing the same thing. That is, equity courts began awarding damages and profits in trademark cases
after 1870, a result probably due, at least in part, to the change to the patent law brought by § 55
of the 1870 Act. See supra notes 109-36 and accompanying text (discussing why equity courts began
awarding damages in trademark cases during the middle period).
172 Dickinson v. 0. & W. Thurn Co., 8 F.2d 570, 575 (6th Cir. 1925).
173 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Labs., Inc., 155 F.2d 59, 63 n.1 (4th Cir. 1946) (noting
the plaintiff was unable to prove any actual monetary injury despite evidence of an intentionally
deceptive product substitution scheme by defendants).
174 Gehl v. Hebe Co., 276 F. 271,274 (7th Cir. 1921) (noting the a defendant's good faith would
"have a bearing on the question of punitive damages, but would not affect the proposition of actual
damage"); P. E. Sharpless Co. v. Lawrence, 213 F. 423, 426 (3d Cir. 1914) (holding that evidence
of willful infringement is relevant to an award of profits, but may not be required to obtain
damages); Rubber & Celluloid Harness Trimming Co. v. F. W. Devoe & C. T. Reynolds Co., 233
F. 150, 160 (D.N.J. 1916) (following P.E. Sbarpless).
175 The Dickinson case quoted above provides a good example. The district court directed a
master to report on profits and damages. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit addressed the profits remedy
38
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol17/iss2/3
CONFUSION CODIFIED
2. Defendant's Profits-Clarity Emerges, Then Fades. There was some confusion
during the middle period concerning the showing required to obtain an accounting
of defendant's profits. Most courts required proof of deliberate infringement. At
the beginning of the late period, the Massachusetts Supreme Court endorsed this
view in a decision that was followed by many courts. After a careful review of
cases addressing this issue, the court concluded:
There is some conflict in the decisions; but we think that the weight
of modem authority is in favor of the rule that an account of profits
will not be taken where the wrongful use of a trade-mark or a
tradename has been merely accidental or without any actual
wrongful intent to defraud a plaintiff or to deceive the public.'
17 6
Courts in other states followed this lead, and by the time the Lanham Act was
enacted, one could say with some certainty that a plaintiff in a trademark case had
to prove deceptive intent to obtain a defendant's profits."7 In fact, no cases were
and damages remedy separately. In reviewing the objections to the profits award, the court focused
on the defendant's actions, and noted that the accounting began from the date defendant was put
on notice of the alleged infringement. Dickinson, 8 F.2d at 572. This approach is entirely consistent
with the discussion above, as it looks solely to the defendant's culpability and not to the plaintiff's
injury.
When the Sixth Circuit turned to the damages issue, it began with the language quoted above.
Id. at 575. The court then noted the absence of evidence to support each of plaintiff's damages
theories. Id. See also Coca-Cola, 155 F.2d at 63-64 (rejecting claim for actual or enhanced damages
because plaintiff failed to prove any actual injury, but allowing profits based on defendants' bad
faith).
The Dickinson case contains another indication that intent was no longer an element of a
damages claim in a trademark case. The court cited six cases in support of its ruling on the damages
issue. Every case was a patent infringement action decided under the 1870 Patent Act. Dickinson,
8 F.2d at 575. The Patent Act provided damages as a right upon proof of infringement. There was
no requirement to prove bad faith or willful infringement in a patent case to recover damages. The
reliance on such cases is a strong indication that courts had dropped the intent requirement in
trademark cases.
176 Regis v. Jaynes, 77 N.E. 774, 776 (Mass. 1906). The maintenance of the intent requirement
for profits claims, while dropping this requirement for damages claims is ironic. In the early
trademark cases in equity, the chancellors required proof of intent because the early common law
actions had required such proof. Equity was simply following the maxim aequitas sequitur legem
("equity follows the law"). The rule of law changed, but this time equity did not follow.
177 Liberty Oil Corp. v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 258 N.W. 241, 243 (Mich. 1935); Globe-
Wemicke Co. v. Safe-Cabinet Co., 144 N.E. 711,713 (Ohio 1924) ("IT]he infringement or imitation
is shown to be deliberate and willful, the injured party is entitled to recover all the profits realized
by the offending party upon the manufactured articles in question."); United Drug Co. v. Kovacs,
123 A. 654, 655 (Pa. 1924) ("A different question would arise if its imitation had been an innocent
one; being intentional, the duty to account is ordinarily a matter of tight and of course.'); Holley
Milling Co. v. Salt Lake &Jordan Mill & Elevator Co., 197 P. 731,733 (Utah 1921); Kickapoo Dev.
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found from the late period where a court purposefully awarded an accounting of
defendant's profits absent evidence of willful infringement or some other form of
bad faith.'
Some courts, however, did question the majority rule. When presented with
the argument that an accounting of profits required proof of willful infringement,
the Sixth Circuit responded: "We do not understand upon what theory the profits
should be so confined, and do not get anything satisfactory to that effect out of
the authorities cited." '79 Though this statement seems to indicate a break from the
majority position, the statement was dicta because the court found the
infringement was willful.' 8
It should also be noted that courts during this period were quick to find a
defendant guilty of intentional infringement. Several cases held that where a
defendant adopted a trademark that was a colorable imitation of another's
Corp. v. Kickapoo Orchard Co., 285 N.W. 354, 359-60 (Wis. 1939); Wood v. Peffer, 130 P.2d 220,
225-26 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942); Notaseme Hosiery Co. v. Straus, 209 F. 495, 496 (S.D.N.Y.
1913); Rubber & Celuloid Harness Trimming Co. v. F. W. Devoe & C. T. Reynolds Co., 233 F. 150,
160 (D.N.J. 1916).
A leading commentator of the period took the same view. "An accounting will not be
ordered where the infringing party acted innocently and in ignorance of the plaintiff's rights,
provided such party stops his illegal practices after he discovers the truth." HARRY D. NIMs, THE
LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETION AND TRADE-MARKS 1078 (3d ed. 1929).
"' The qualified language is intentional, because a full accounting of defendant's profits was
inadvertently granted in a leading case from this period, the Mishawaka Woolen case, which is
discussed below. Profits were awarded despite the district court's conclusion that the "infringement
was neither deliberately willful nor in bad faith." Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S.
Kresge Co., 67 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (E.D. Mich. 1946). For reasons explained below, it is not wise
to place any weight on this aspect of the Mishawaka Woolen litigation. See infra notes 189-201 and
accompanying text.
"7 Lawrence-Williams Co. v. Societe Enfants Gombault Et Cie, 52 F.2d 774,778 (6th Cir. 1931).
0 Id. ("[T]he case does not sufficiently show that the infringement was not willful."). Despite
this comment, the case does provide some support for the proposition that some courts awarded
profits without evidence of willful infringement, at least by modem standards. In this case, the
defendant believed it had a legal right to use the trademark at issue. It turned out defendant was
wrong, but there was no evidence of an intent to trade on the good will of the plaintiff. Consider
the court's justification for questioning the defendant's innocence:
[Defendant's] use of the mark was deliberate. The situation is about the same
as where a defendant infringes a patent under the advice of counsel that it is
invalid. Such infringement is not usually so willful as to justify treble damages,
but we think it does justify, here as there, turning over to the plaintiff the actual
profits received.
Id. By modem standards, this defendant probably would not have been deemed a willful infringer.
Most courts now focus on whether the defendant intended to trade on the plaintiff's good will, and
reject allegations of willful infringement based only on knowledge of the plaintiff's trademark and
an intent to compete. See, e.g., General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 627 (8th Cir. 1987).
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technical trademark,' fraudulent intent would be presumed." 2 Given this
practice, it is not as clear that courts required proof of actual culpability as a
prerequisite to obtaining an accounting of defendant's profits.
Two important decisions by the United States Supreme Court provide good
illustrations of this point, and help demonstrate why this issue was not entirely
clear when the Lanham Act was adopted. In Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf
Brothers & Co.,183 the Court stated, "Having reached the conclusion that
complainant is entitled to the use of the words 'The American Girl' as a
trademark, it results that it is entitled to the profits acquired by defendant from the
manifestly infringing sales .... .""4 This proposition seems to indicate that a
finding of trademark infringement automatically entitles a plaintiff to an award of
defendant's profits.
The Court's position in Hamilton-Brown Shoe, however, is far from clear. The
defendant argued that plaintiff had the burden of proving what portion of the
profits were attributable to the infringement, a task the Court described as
"inherently impossible."'' As an additional reason for rejecting this argument, the
Court noted "that defendant does not stand as an innocent infringer.' 1 6 The
"findings of the court of appeals, supported by abundant evidence, show that the
imitation of complainant's mark was fraudulent.... 187
The Court's analysis does not clarify the requirement for obtaining an
accounting. When the Court discusses the accounting remedy-and here the
Court provides the most complete explanation of the rationale for this remedy to
be found in any leading trademark case' 88 -there is no mention whatsoever that
" A technical trademark is what we now call an inherently distinctive trademark. Sidney A.
Diamond, Untangling the Confusion in Trademark Terminologv, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 290, 291 (1983)
("Historically, the term 'trademark' (the older spelling was 'trade mark' or 'trade-mark) was
restricted to inherently distinctive marks, sometimes known as 'technical trademarks.' ").
182 As one court explained, "in cases involving a technical trade-mark, where fraud will be
presumed from the wrongful use of the trade-mark, without regard to the intent." Daviess County
Distilling Co. v. Martinoni, 117 F. 186, 188 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1902); see also Church & Dwight Co. v.
Russ, 99 F. 276, 279 (C.C.D. Ind. 1900); Reymer & Bros. v. Huyler's, 190 F. 83, 87 (C.C.W.D. Pa.
1911).
'13 240 U.S. 251 (1916).
184 Id. at 259.
185 Id. at 261.
186 Id.
187 id
188 The Court provided the following explanation of the reason defendant's profits are awarded
in trademark cases:
The right to use a trademark is recognized as a kind of property, of which the
owner is entitled to the exclusive enjoyment to the extent that it has been
actually used. The infringer is required in equity to account for and yield up his
gains to the true owner, upon a principle analogous to that which charges a
trustee with the profits acquired by wrongful use of the property of the cestui que
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a plaintiff must prove willful infringement. Instead, the Court's statements could
be read as support for the argument that no such requirement exists.
On the other hand, the Court did accept the finding of intentional
infringement, and used that fact as a reason for not reducing the amount of the
profits award. That is, however, not the same as requiring proof of willful
infringement to obtain an accounting. In fact, perhaps the most accurate
description of the Court's analysis in Hamilton-Brown Shoe is that a plaintiff may be
entitled to an accounting of profits without any showing of willful infringement,
but if the infringement is innocent, the defendant may be entitled to more
generous deductions from the calculated profits. What kind of standard is that?
The Supreme Court addressed the profits remedy again in Mishawaka Rubber
& Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co.'89 This case may have done more to
confuse the issue of whether willful infringement was required to obtain an
accounting than any other case ever decided. Yet ironically, the Supreme Court
never even addressed that issue:
Deeming the matter to present an important question under the
Trade-Mark Act, we brought the case here solely to review the
provisions of the decree dealing with the measure of profits and
damages for the infringement found by the two lower courts.
Whether there was such an infringement as to entitle the petiioner to the
remedies provided by the federal trade-mark laws is therefore not open here. 9'
The Supreme Court's intervention was due to the nature of the accounting granted
by the district court. Defendant was ordered to pay to plaintiff those profits from
sales "'to purchasers who were induced to buy because they believed the heels to
be those of plaintiff and which sales plaintiff would otherwise have made.' """9
The rest of the Supreme Court's analysis in Mishawaka focuses on the burden
of proof in an accounting and whether the plaintiff is limited to those profits
proven to be attributable to the infringement.'92 The Court rejects the approach
taken by the district court because the statute (i.e., the 1905 Trademark Act) places
the burden on the defendant to prove deductions from its gross sales revenue.
The accounting order of the district court was not consistent with the statute, the
Supreme Court held, and therefore the order was reversed.
trust... And profits are then allowed as an equitable measure of compensation,
on the theory of a trust ex makfido.
Id at 259 (citations omitted).
189 316 U.S. 203 (1942).
" Id. at 204-05 (emphasis added).
191 Id at 204.
192 Id at 205-08.
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There is, however, more to the Mishawaka story. The trademark at issue was
a red rubber plug in the heel of shoes made by plaintiff. The prevailing rule at the
time was that color alone could not be a trademark.'93 Defendant did not believe
plaintiff had exclusive rights in the red plug, a reasonable view under the law at
that time. The district court found the overall appearance of the heel of plaintiff's
shoes was distinctive, and thus, defendant's actions were deemed to be unfair
competition. Defendant was enjoined, and a limited accounting was ordered.
When the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case on appeal, it noted that proof of
deceptive intent was required to obtain an accounting of defendant's profits.
The rule prevails in Michigan that an account of profits will not be
taken where the wrongful use of a trade-mark or trade-name has
been merely accidental or without any actual or wrongful intent to
defraud the original owner or to deceive the public. This is in
harmony with the rule prevailing in the federal courts.1 94
The court later stated, "There is no finding of fact in the case at bar, and we find
no evidence in the record to support the inference that appellee adopted the
symbol used on its heels for the fraudulent purpose of attracting to itself business
or sales which belonged to appellant .... 1 95 In fact, the Sixth Circuit noted that
plaintiffs case was "not very strong on the facts, yet it seems to be entitled to the
carefully limited injunction and accounting of profits which was granted."'96
Based on the Sixth Circuit's statement of law, and the findings of fact, it would
seem no accounting should have been granted. Why didn't the Sixth Circuit so
hold? Why didn't the district court refuse plaintiff's request for an accounting?
When the case was later remanded for a full accounting, the district court was
quite clear: "Defendant's infringement was neither deliberately wilful nor in bad
faith."' 97 Indeed, the worst the district court could say of defendant was that
"prior to this suit.., it regarded plaintiffs claim of infringement as lacking in
merit. ,
198
What happened in this case? The Supreme Court ordered a full accounting of
defendant's profits in a case where the defendant did not willfully infringe. But
because the Supreme Court purportedly limited its review to the question of how
193 See, e.g., Stewart W. Richards & H. Kenneth Hailer, Shade and Scent Marks, 44 TRADEMARK
REP. 1125, 1126 (1954) ("It is, of course, axiomatic that color alone cannot ordinarily be
appropriated as a trademark apart from symbol or design.").
'9' Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 119 F.2d 316,323 (6th Cir. 1941).
191 Id. at 324.
196 Id. at 326.
197 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 67 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (E.D.
Mich. 1946).
19S Id.
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an accounting should be conducted-that is, to the computational process-the
Court never reached the question of whether an accounting was warranted. 99
Every court that dealt with this case mishandled it.
The accounting ordered by the district court in Mishawaka looks as much like
a damages remedy as an accounting of defendant's profits. The court limited
plaintiff's recovery to profits from sales plaintiff would have made but for the
infringement. That is a damages approach, because it is based on plaintiffs losses,
not defendant's gains. But the district court ordered defendant to pay its profits
on the sales plaintiff would have made. The remedy provided by the district court
was a cross between a damages award and an accounting of defendant's profits.
Indeed, the district court's hybrid award was closer to a damages award, with the
error being the court's use of defendant's profit margin rather than plaintiff's to
measure the damages.
And a damages award in Mishawaka would have been consistent with the
general trend at that time. Damages were available to a prevailing plaintiff, even
if defendant's infringement was innocent.2°° The problem for plaintiffs was the
proof of injury. The plaintiff in Mishawaka probably would have recovered little,
if anything, under the district court's order, because it would have been difficult
to prove the portion of defendant's sales that plaintiff would have made.
In the end, Mishawaka created confusion on an issue that was relatively clear
in the lower federal courts and in the state courts. Either the Supreme Court or
the Sixth Circuit should have reversed the district court and remanded with clear
instructions about the difference between plaintiffs damages and defendant's
profits. It seems clear the district court never intended to grant the type of
monetary relief the Supreme Court ultimately ordered. The district court should
have been given the opportunity to correct its error. Instead, the Supreme Court
perpetuated that error and made it worse.
After the Supreme Court muddied the waters, it was a bit less clear what the
standard was for obtaining a defendant's profits. Was deceptive intent merely a
factor to consider in determining the amount of a profits award, as Hamilton-Brown
Shoe seemed to suggest? Was it appropriate to award a full accounting when the
defendant's infringement was wholly innocent, as ultimately happened in
Mishawaka?
199 The Supreme Court should have realized that its narrow focus was not workable in the
Mishawaka case, because the allegedly computational error was not computational at all. As
explained above, the trial court granted a limited, hybrid remedy based on the weakness of plaintiff's
claim. By treating the appeal as merely a question as to the computational process that should be
used to conduct a normal accounting of defendant's profits, the Supreme Court forced a specially
crafted remedy into a standardized procedure that did not fit the facts of the case.
o See supra notes 173-74.
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This section began with a discussion of a Massachusetts Supreme Court
decision that helped clarify the law on this issue at the start of the late period.
Indeed, state courts led the way on this issue. Their views were consistent and
clear. Most federal courts followed the same rules.2"' In the end, the United
States Supreme Court's two late period decisions dealing with the accounting
remedy were more of a distraction than anything else. The clear majority rule
remained that proof of deliberate deception was required to obtain an accounting
of defendant's profits in a trademark case.
3. Injuncions-ittle Change. The rules regarding injunctions in trademark cases
were clear well before the Lanham Act was enacted. Injunctions were granted
upon proof that defendant's actions were likely to cause confusion. Equitable
defenses rarely would block an injunction, but often would bar money relief 2
These rules were established during the middle period and remained unchanged
through the late period.
4. Punitive Damages. The middle period ended with a hint that punitive
damages might be available in trademark cases. 3 As noted above, the 1905
Trademark Act appeared to sanction that view, as well.2°4 Finally, two trademark
law treatises published in the early twentieth century indicated that punitive
damages were, or should have been, available.0 5 The author of one treatise made
"0 Mishawaka provides a good illustration of this point. In discussing this issue in the Mishawaka
case, the Sixth Circuit noted, "The rule prevails in Michigan that an account of profits will not be
taken where the wrongful use of a trade-mark or trade-name has been merely accidental or without
any actual or wrongful intent to defraud the original owner or to deceive the public." Mishawaka
Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 119 F.2d 316, 323 (6th Cir. 1941).
202 There was one exception to this proposition, as noted above. Some courts refused to provide
any relief to plaintiffs who made material misrepresentations to consumers about their product.
The questionable medicine cases of the mid-nineteenth century provide examples of this practice.
See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
0 See Hennessy v. Wilmerding-Loewe Co., 103 F. 90, 94 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
204 Did Congress intend to authorize punitive damages in the 1905 Act? The answer to that
question is not clear. Congress, for the first time, expressly authorized courts to increase actual
damages awards by up to three times. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 19, 33 Stat. 724, 728,
729. The margin note summarizing Section 16 of the 1905 Act (i.e., the section specifying the
remedies available in an action at law) states that it identifies "punishment for counterfeiting, etc."
Act of Feb. 20, 1905, Ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 724, 728 (margin notes).
The statutory authority to award enhanced damages did not escape the attention of the
courts. The Seventh Circuit held that the 1905 Trademark Act "does not exclude exemplary
damages," and that "punitive damages may be allowed" in an action under the Act. Aladdin Mfg.
Co. v. Mande Lamp Co. of Am., 116 F.2d 708, 716 (7th Cir. 1941); see also Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi-
Cola Labs., Inc., 155 F.2d 59, 63 (4th Cir. 1946) (holding that punitive damages under the 1905
Trademark Act are available only if one has proven actual damages, because the Act authorized
increases of actual damages by up to three times; absent proof of actual damages, there was nothing
to increase).
205 PAUL, supra note 155, § 324 (punitive damages available in trademark actions at law);
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a passionate argument in favor of punitive damages: "It is manifest that in a case
of deliberate counterfeiting of a trade-mark there should be a recovery of punitive
damages, or at least an opportunity given the jury to assess punitive damages." 2 6
The author believed punitive damages were needed "to protect society from the
ravages of trade-mark infringers .... 207
With this foundation laid, it is not surprising that courts began to accept that
punitive damages were available in trademark cases. The earliest reported
trademark case that clearly involved an award of punitive damages is Lampert v.
Judge & Dob Drug Co.,2 s a case decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri.
Lampert was a cigar maker who had established a reputation for quality.
209
Defendants operated a retail store in St. Louis and sold various items, including
cigars.210 Defendants purchased some cigars from plaintiff. The cigars were
contained in boxes with the plaintiff's trademark. These boxes were used by
defendant to display the cigars in its store.
Defendant engaged in an illegal substitution scheme. Instead of selling
plaintiff's high-quality, and apparently expensive, cigars, defendant would place
lower quality cigars in the plaintiffs cigar box.2 ' When a customer requested
plaintiffs cigars, defendant would take the inferior cigars from the box and sell
them to the customer. Because the cigars were taken from plaintiffs cigar box,
the customer believed he was getting plaintiffs cigars. Plaintiff proved this
scheme at trial. 212
The plaintiff, however, was unable to quantify his losses. He was awarded one
cent in nominal damages and $500 in punitive damages. On appeal, the defendant
argued that punitive damages were not appropriate in a trademark infringement
case. The Missouri Supreme Court considered a number of cases and the views
of leading commentators on trademark law. In the end, the court held that
punitive damages are proper in trademark cases where willful infringement is
shown.213
HOPKINs, spra note 58, § 112, at 243-44.
2D6 HOPKINS, supra note 58, § 112, at 243-44.
207 Id. § 112, at 242.
" 141 S.W. 1095 (Mo. 1911). As noted above, the earlier case of Warner v. Roehr may have
involved a punitive damages award. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. There is no doubt
on this point in the Limpert case.
209 Id. at 1096.
210 Id.
211 I .
212 Id. at 1096-97.
213 Id. at 1099. The court also ruled on another important question: Could punitive damages
be awarded where only nominal damages were granted? Yes, the court answered, because the
purpose of punitive damages was not dependent upon the plaintiff's ability to quantify its actual
losses. Id. at 1097-98.
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The Montana Supreme Court followed Missouri's lead and approved a punitive
damages award in Tru, olino Food Products Co. v. F. W. Woolworth Co.2"4 TruzZolino
involved a fact pattern somewhat similar to that of the Lampert case described
above. Plaintiff was a tamale maker who had developed a reputation for making
excellent tamales.215 Defendant operated a large store with a lunch counter.
Defendant told customers that it sold plaintiff's tamales, but in fact sold a less
expensive, inferior product.216 The jury awarded plaintiff $750 in actual damages
and $5,000 in punitive damages.217 The Montana Supreme Court affirmed.21
Another important, but rather confusing, punitive damages case from this
period is Aladdin Manufacturing Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. ofAr.21 9 In the case's third
appearance before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,22 the court addressed
the remedies available to the prevailing party. The district court had referred the
matter to a master to conduct hearings and to make a recommendation as to the
remedies that should be awarded. The master issued detailed findings and
recommended awarding defendant's profits and punitive damages. The district
court rejected the master's recommendation and awarded no monetary relief.
The Seventh Circuit reversed. Much of the decision addresses the
computation of the profits. When the court turned to the punitive damages issue,
it held, "If the facts warranted, exemplary or punitive damages were properly
214 91 P.2d 415 (Mont. 1939).
215 Id. at 416--17.
216 Id. at 417.
217 Id.
218 Id at 420.
219 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cit. 1941).
'o This case was a priority dispute concerning the Aladdin trademark. Mande, the defendant
and counter-plaintiff, began using the Aladdin trademark on kerosene lamps in 1908. Mantle Lamp
Co. of Am. v. Aladdin Mfg. Co., 78 F.2d 426, 427 (7th Cit. 1935). Mande heavily promoted its
product and the Aladdin trademark became well-known. In fact, Mande's efforts had been so
successful, the Seventh Circuit concluded use of the same mark on any type of lamp by another
"must invariably deceive and confuse the buying public." Id. at 428.
The district court initially held that Mande had the exclusive right to use the mark on
kerosene lamps and Aladdin had the exclusive right to use the mark on electric lamps. This was a
bad result for Mande, the senior user, because the use of electric lighting was quickly replacing
kerosene lamps. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Mande was entitled to an injunction
barring any use on lamps by Aladdin. The appeals court also concluded that Aladdin had
intentionally misled the public and caused actual confusion. Id at 428-29.
On remand, the district court held that Mande was barred from recovering monetary relief
because of its delay in bringing suit. A second appeal was brought by Mande, and the Seventh
Circuit reversed again. Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mande Lamp Co. of Am., 86 F.2d 141,141 (7th Cit.
1936). The Seventh Circuit held that its prior decision resolved the laches and acquiescence issues
and, therefore, those issues were not open to review by the district court. Id.
The case was remanded again, which brings the matter to the point discussed above.
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allowed.""22 And the court seemed to conclude that the facts warranted such
relief. "In the present case the master concluded and we agree that the acts of the
infringer were wanton, wilful and intentionally fraudulent .... "' The Seventh
Circuit cited numerous cases as support for its holding that punitive damages are
available in a trademark infringement action.'
After so unequivocally approving of punitive damages and finding the
infringement deserving of punishment, one would have expected the court to
approve a substantial punitive damages award. But that is not what happened. In
fact, it is difficult to say whether the damages award approved by the Seventh
Circuit was punitive, compensatory, or some combination of the two. The
opinion read:
[Mantle] was entitled to compensatory damages and in addition such
limited exemplary damages as the facts and circumstances justify.
Considering all of the evidence, we think that the total damage,
including the injury to appellant's business and its good name, the
nullification of its advertising, and all other elements, both
compensatory and exemplary, amounted to not less than $25,000
and not in excess thereof, in addition to the expenditures incurred
in litigation. Indeed we believe the evidence sustains the allowance
of this sum purely as compensatory damages. We are not inclined
to approve further punitive damages in view of the punishment
meted out in the contempt proceedings.224
The Seventh Circuit ultimately added about $18,500 more to the damages award,
an amount the court linked directly to the "fraudulent and wilful infringement and
unfair competition ....
The trend toward the acceptance of punitive damages is further illustrated by
the analysis found in a number of other cases. None of these cases involved an
award of punitive damages, but all clearly suggest such an award would have been
available in an appropriate case. For example, when a defendant argued the
221 116 F.2d at 716.
2 Id.
23 Id. at 716-17.
' Id at 717. The court indicated that the full award could be sustained "purely as
compensatory damages," immediately after saying the award was "both compensatory and
exemplary." The reference to an apparently punitive sanction for contempt indicates that the
Seventh Circuit felt the infringer was punished, a conclusion that is consistent with the court's
strong language concerning the need for a punitive remedy in the case.
2' Id. This award was based on the attorney fees and costs Mande spent to oppose a federal
trademark application filed by Aladdin. The master and the Seventh Circuit viewed Aladdin's effort
to obtain a trademark registration as part of its plan to trade on Mande's goodwill. Id.
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compensatory damages awarded by a master were excessive, the court noted that
defendant was "guilty of 'intentional imitation,' " and that this fact would have
supported punitive damages, a clear suggestion defendant was in no position to
complain about the award. 6 And when plaintiffs in equity actions sought
punitive damages, some courts responded by explaining that while punitive
damages were available in an action at law, such relief could not be obtained in
equity.
227
Though there were few trademark cases in which punitive damages were
awarded, the trend was toward general approval of this remedy. By the time the
Lanham Act became law in 1946, one could say with some certainty that a
deliberate trademark infringer faced a real prospect of having to pay punitive
damages in a common law trademark infringement action.
5. Large Monetay Awards in Trademark Cases. The late period also saw the first
large trademark infringement money judgments, including two high-profile cases.
The first such case is Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers & Co.," 5 a case
discussed above. Plaintiff used the mark American Girl on its shoes, and
defendant used the mark American Lady. The primary issue presented at trial was
whether the mark American Girl was a valid trademark or a merely geographically
descriptive phrase. The district court found the mark descriptive and denied
plaintiffs claims.
The plaintiff appealed, and the Eighth Circuit reversed. The appellate court
reviewed the evidence of plaintiffs long use and promotion of its mark. Though
the phrase American Girl was not a valid trademark when first adopted, "it had,
nevertheless, by their long-continued use of it, come to have a secondary meaning,
indicative of the origin and manufacturer of the shoes .... ,29 The court also
concluded that defendant had acted with an intent to deceive, primarily because
the defendant ignored plaintiff's objections and copied almost every aspect of
plaintiff's advertising of its goods.2" The case was remanded for an accounting.
2 Wawak & Co. v. Kaiser, 129 F.2d 66, 69 (7th Cir. 1942).
17 Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Labs., Inc., 155 F.2d 59 (4th Cit. 1946); Winthrop Chem. Co. v.
Blackman, 288 N.Y.S. 389 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936).
m 240 U.S. 251 (1916).
29 Wolf Bros. & Co. v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 165 F. 413, 417 (8th Cit. 1908).
230 The plaintiff's American Girl mark was accompanied by a picture of a lady. Plaintiff used the
slogan, "A shoe as good as its name," in its advertising. Defendant used the mark American Lady,
also used a picture of a lady on its packaging, and adopted the slogan, "The shoe deserves its name."
Id. at 413-14. The Eighth Circuit found the extent of defendant's copying, and the fact that it
ignored repeated objections by plaintiff evidence of bad faith. Id. at 416.
Defendant also argued that plaintiff's delay in bringing suit constituted laches. The Eighth
Circuit disagreed, noting that plaintiff had objected a number of times before bringing suit. The
court, however, did restrict the accounting of defendant's profits to the period after plaintiff filed
suit, thus giving defendant some relief due to plaintiff's delay. Id at 418.
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Upon remand, the district court referred the accounting to a master. After
evaluating the parties' evidence, the master fixed the profits to be awarded at just
less than $450,000. Defendant argued that its actions were not likely to confuse
customers because their packaging also identified their company. The district
court agreed, 3' and therefore overruled the master's recommendation. The
plaintiff was awarded $1 in nominal damages. Not surprisingly, plaintiff again
appealed to the Eighth Circuit.
The Eighth Circuit reversed again, pointing out that its prior decision had
resolved the infringement issue and the question of defendant's intent. 32 The
district court's reason for overruling the master, therefore, was improper. The
only issue properly before the district court, according to the Eighth Circuit, was
the amount of profits to be awarded, not whether there was infringement 33 The
Eighth Circuit reinstated the master's ruling, and directed the district court to
enter judgment for that amount. 3  The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and
affirmed.235 It was a long fight, but plaintiff ultimately prevailed, and recovered
about $450,000 in defendant's profits, a substantial award in the early twentieth
century.
After considering the evidence, the district judge explained,
the court is of opinion that the shoes were accompanied with 'matter clearly
indicating that such shoes are of its (defendant's) own manufacture, and
therefore, not of complainant's.' If the defendant had stationed at the door of
each of its customers a man with strong lungs, proclaiming in stentorian voice
that 'these shoes are the make of the Hamilton-Brown Shoe Company of St.
Louis,' it is hard to perceive how the notice to buyers of shoes would have been
more effective in that way than by the means adopted.
Wolf Bros. & Co. v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 192 F. 930, 935 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1912).
232 Wolf Bros. & Co. v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 206 F. 611, 615 (8th Cir. 1913).
3 There is an inconsistency in the court's analysis on this point. The master divided
defendant's sales into three groups. Each group differed in the extent to which the packaging of
the shoes had additional information identifying the defendant. The master concluded that the first
two groups did not have enough distinguishing indicia, and he therefore recommended awarding
the profits from those two groups. The third group, however, more clearly identified the defendant,
and the master thus concluded that sales from this group should not be included. WoffBros., 192
F. at 932.
But this analysis is exactly the same as what the district court did. The master did not limit
himself to computational issues. He concluded that the third group was not infringing, and thus
excluded it from the award. Plaintiff asked the Eighth Circuit to modify the master's
recommendation to include profits from the third group, a request entirely consistent with the
court's reason for reversing. The Eighth Circuit, however, rejected plaintiff's request, and
confirmed the master's recommendation in whole. WoffBros., 206 F. at 619.
SWolfBros., 206 F. at 619.
23s Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916).
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The other key case involving a large monetary award was L P. Larson, Jr., Co.
v. Win. Wrigley, Jr., Co.36  The plaintiff, Larson, was a small company that
introduced a chewing gum named Wintermint."3 Defendant, Wrigley, was the
giant in the field. Indeed, when the accounting was eventually done in this case,
Wrigley reported that its sales of Doublemint gum during a four year period
(1914-1918) totaled approximately $57,000,000 in gross revenue." s
Though the initial suit was filed by Wrigley, it was Larson that hit the home
run. The courts eventually came down strongly on the side of Larson, finding that
Wrigley had made false statements to the courts and had tried to oppress and
force Larson out of the chewing gum business3 9 As to the key trademark
infringement claim, the court found that Larson had priority, having introduced
its product seven months before Wrigley introduced Doublemint. 4 ° Given the
evidence of bad faith by Wrigley, it is hardly surprising that an accounting of
profits was ordered.
After much legal wrangling, Larson obtained a profits award of about
$1.35 million.241 It was one of if not the-largest monetary award granted in a
trademark case during the early twentieth century. Larson had to fight a long fight
to get the award, a story rather similar to that of the Hamilton-Brown Shoe case
described above. The first suit in the Wrigley litigation was filed by Wrigley in
1911. The final ruling in the case, by the United States Supreme Court, did not
come until 1928, seventeen years later.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LANHAM AcT
Having completed the long, but important, historical review of trademark
remedies, we turn now to the legislative background of the Lanham Act. The
legislative history provides little help in making sense of the Act's remedial
scheme. It is a prolonged legislative history, stretching over more than twenty
years, and it does provide some insights into the concerns of drafters and
legislators. But in the end, the legislative record leaves several key questions
unanswered.
The one-remedy-at-a-time approach used through prior sections is applied
here, as well, but with one important variation. First, the general legislative record
277 U.S. 97 (1928).
L. P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. Wm. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 253 F. 914, 916-17 (7th Cir. 1918).
z L. P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. Win. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 20 F.2d 830, 832 (7th Cir. 1927).
'9 Larson, 253 F. at 916.
240 Id. at 916-17. Wrigley apparently did not realize that Larson had priority. Wrigley sued and
alleged that Larson's Wintermint infringed Wrigley's rights in its Doublemint brand. Larson,
realizing he had priority, admitted the two trademarks were likely to cause confusion. Wrigley's own
allegations were turned against it. Id
241 Larson, 20 F.2d at 836.
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is reviewed, including the various bills and hearings that led to the Lanham Act of
1946. We then turn to the now familiar sequence: damages, defendant's profits,
injunctions, and, finally, punitive damages.
A. THE LEGISLATIVE RECORD THAT LED TO THE LANHAM ACT
In 1924, Senator Richard P. Ernst, a Kentucky Republican, introduced a new
trademark and unfair competition bill in the Senate Committee on Patents.242 The
1905 Trademark Act had been in force for less than twenty years, and already
there was a call for major change to federal trademark law. To understand why
this happened, we need to take a brief look at two of the most important
trademark cases decided during the early twentieth century.243
In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf 4 and United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus
Co.,245 the United States Supreme Court explained the territorial nature of
common law trademark rights. In both cases, the plaintiffs and defendants
242 S. 2679, 68th Cong. (1924).
243 The legislative record discusses a number of purposes and goals of the trademark reform
bills. For example, the Senate Report that followed final work on the bill that became the Lanham
Act of 1946, explains that "any trade-mark statute" has the dual purposes of protecting the public
from deception and protecting the investments of trademark owners. S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 3
(1946). The more specific purposes of the final trademark bill were:
1. To put all existing trade-mark statutes in a single piece of legislation.
2. To carry out by statute our international commitments to the end that
American traders in foreign countries may secure the protection to their
marks to which they are entitled....
3. To modernize the trade-mark statutes so that they will conform to legitimate
present-day business practice.
Id at 5. The report goes on to explain the concerns behind the third purpose as follows:
The theory once prevailed that protection of trade-marks was entirely a State
matter and that the right to a mark was a common-law right. This theory was
the basis of previous national trade-mark statutes. Many years ago the Supreme
Court held and has recently repeated that there is no Federal common law. It
is obvious that the States can change the common law with respect to trade-
marks and many of them have, with the possible result that there may be as
many different varieties of common law as there are States. A man's rights in
his trade-mark in one State may differ widely from the rights which he enjoys in
another.
However, trade is no longer local, but is nationaL Marks used in interstate commere are
proper# the suject ofFederalregulation. It would seem as if national legislation along
national lines securing to the owners of trade-marks in interstate commerce
definite rights should be enacted and should be enacted now.
Id. (emphasis added). The final paragraph quoted above reflects the need for national protection
that was highlighted by the two Supreme Court cases discussed above.
244 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
24 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
52
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol17/iss2/3
CONFUSION CODIFIED
adopted and used similar trademarks, but in wholly distinct geographic regions.
The parties, again in both cases, acted in good faith and without any knowledge
of the other's use. Eventually, the parties came into contact, and trademark
infringement suits followed.
The senior user in both cases claimed its right to use the mark was exclusive,
an argument based on the view that trademark rights were enforceable throughout
the United States. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining in the
Rectanus case:
The asserted doctrine is based upon the fundamental error of
supposing that a trade-mark right is a right in gross or at large, like
a statutory copyright or a patent for an invention, to either of which,
in truth, it has little or no analogy. There is no such thing as
property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an
established business or trade in connection with which the mark is
employed.' 6
In fact, "a trade-mark confers no monopoly whatever in a proper sense, but is
merely a convenient means for facilitating the protection of one's good-
w . ,,247
The Court then explained the basis for common law trademark protection. A
trademark right follows the trade, or in the words of the Court:
It results that the adoption of a trade-mark does not, at least in the
absence of some valid legislation enacted for the purpose, project
the right of protection in advance of the extension of the trade, or
operate as a claim of territorial rights over areas into which it
thereafter may be deemed desirable to extend the trade. ...
[w]herever the trade goes, attended by the use of the mark, the right
of the trader to be protected against the sale by others of their wares
in the place of his wares will be sustained.2 s
Notice the critical caveat in the Court's explanation of the territorially limited
nature of common law trademark protection: "at least in the absence of some
valid legislation enacted for the purpose. 2 49 This statement surely contributed to
the movement for a new federal trademark statute.
246 Id at 97.
247 Id. at 98.
248 Id.
249 Id.
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The trademark bill introduced by Senator Ernst in 1924 sought to establish a
federal trademark registration system that would create the sort of nationwide
trademark rights the parties desired in the Metcalf and Rectanus cases. 5 ° On this
point, the proposed law would have changed the common law, by providing an
attractive federal, statutory alternative to common law trademark protection. The
proposition that the Lanham Act was intended to codify the common law2s' is
only half right, as this proposition applies only to those parts of the Lanham Act
that were separate from the new registration scheme.5 2
The legislative process that preceded the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946
extended over twenty years. 213  A House bill identical to the Ernst bill was
introduced by Representative Florian Lampert in 1925. 2s Senator Ernst lost his
bid for reelection in 1926,255 and other senators took over the role of sponsoring
the trademark legislation in the Senate. Representative Albert Vestal of Indiana
' The trademark registration system of the 1905 Trademark Act did not provide adequate
protection for trademark owners. See, e.g., 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 5:3 (4th ed. 2005) (noting that "even with the 1920 amendments, the basic 1905
Trademark Act remained inadequate to cope with the realities of twentieth century commerce and
brand names").
The Ernst Bill, on the other hand, relied on the notice provided by federal registration as a
justification for creating nation-wide trademark rights upon registration. S. 2679, 68th Cong. (1924).
The scheme added publication of trademarks seeking registration, and allowed interested parties to
oppose the registration. Id. % 7,13(a) (publication and opposition, respectively). Registration under
the Ernst Bill would have constituted constructive notice of the registrant's trademark rights and
injunctions would have been national in scope, absent proof of prior use by a defendant. Id. § 1,
2(g), 4,18(h) (registration, national rights, constructive notice, and national injunctions, respectively).
251 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Edward Rogers, one of the primary drafters of the
early trademark reform bills and an active participant in the entire reform process explained that one
"primary purpose" of trademark reform bills was "generally to apply the common law of trade--
marks to commerce over which Congress has jurisdiction." S. Rep. No. 71-1496, at 5-6 (1929); see
also 74 Cong. Rec. 6106 (1931) (remarks of Sen. Hebert to similar effect); 72 Cong. Rec. 7350 (1930)
(remarks of Rep. Vestal to similar effect).
252 "Putting aside statutory innovations directly linked to the public notice provided by the Act's
registration system, the Lanham Act codifies the basic common law principles governing both the
subject matter and scope of protection." Robert C. Denicola, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics ofFederal
Trademark Legislation and the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1996, at 75, 79-80.
"s The duration of the trademark reform process is not so surprising when one considers what
else was happening during the period. The 1929 crash of the stock market, the Great Depression,
and World War II all occurred during the federal trademark law reform process. If there is a
surprising aspect of this story, it is that the reform effort continued through such tumultuous times.
' H.R. 8637, 68th Cong. (1925).
255 See THE KENTUcKY ENCYCLOPEDIA 53 (John E. Kleber ed., 3d ed. 1992). Senator Ernst did
introduce a trademark bill in the 69th Congress. S. 2547, 69th Cong. (1926). This bill was
substantially similar to S. 2679, his earlier bill.
[Vol. 17:245
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took responsibility in the House, introducing his first bill in late 1925.' There
were at least twenty-one trademark bills introduced in Congress between 1924 and
1946, and numerous hearings were held during this period on the reform effort.
Representative Fritz Lanham of Texas took over responsibility for the
trademark law reform effort in the House of Representatives in 1938, when he
introduced his first bill. Representative Lanham introduced a new trademark
reform bill in every Congress until 1946 (a total of seven bills). The resulting
federal trademark law was named in his honor. The Lanham Trademark Act
of 1946 forever changed trademark law in the United States.
The remedies provisions of the various bills had several similarities. Every bill
authorized courts to issue injunctions and to award damages and defendant's
profits. Almost all of the bills allowed courts to increase and decrease profits
awards, and all of the bills authorized increased damages up to three times the
actual damages proven. There were, however, a number of differences in the bills,
and some of those differences raise interesting questions, as will become clear
when the bills are considered below.
The remedies section of the 1924 Ernst bill is provided below.257  Every
trademark reform bill introduced between 1924 and 1932 contained substantially
the same remedies language. 5 Under these bills, "the remedy of injunction shall
256 H.R. 6248, 69th Cong. (1925).
157 S. 2679, 68th Cong. § 18 (1924), provided:
Any person who shall, in commerce, infringe any registered trade-mark, shall be
liable-
(a) To an injunction restraining infringement of such registered trade-mark.
(b) To pay to the owner all profits which the infringer suffered from the
infringement.
(c) To pay to the owner all profits which the infringer shall have made from
such infringement, and in proving profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove
sales only, and the defendant shall be required to prove every element of cost
or deduction claimed; but there shall be no recovery of profits from any
defendant whose adoption and use of an infringing trade-mark was in good faith
and without knowledge of the plaintiff's right thereto, except such profits as
accrued therefrom after such defendant had actual notice or knowledge thereof.
(d) If the court shall find that the damages or profits, or both, are either
inadequate or excessive, the court may, in its discretion, decree the payment of
such sum as the court shall find to be just according to the circumstances of the
case, such sum to constitute compensation and not a penalty.
(h) Except as provided in section 12, the right of the owner of a registered trade-
mark to the remedy of injunction shall extend throughout the United States and
shall not be limited to be merely coextensive with the territory within which
such owner has used such registered trade-mark; and the court may give the
plaintiff the benefit of all other remedies named in this section.
's H.R. 8637, 68th Cong. § 18 (1925) (companion bill to the Ernst bill); H.R. 6284, 69th Cong.
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extend throughout the United States and shall not be limited to be merely
coextensive with the territory within which such owner has used such registered
trade-mark." 9  The bills left no doubt that the proposed reform would
fundamentally alter the territorial nature of trademark rights for all federally
registered marks.
The damages provision of these early bills contained language that is odd by
modem standards. A plaintiff's actual damages were described as "profits which
the infringer suffered from the infringement. ' ,26°  Courts were authorized to
increase or decrease "damages or profits, or both ... as the court shall find to be
just according to the circumstances of the case .. ,,261 No limit was imposed on
a court's discretion to increase or decrease monetary awards.
The early bills contained an interesting provision regarding the defendant's
profits remedy. After authorizing the remedy, the bills stated, "but there shall be
no recovery of profits from any defendant whose adoption and use of an
infringing trade-mark was in good faith and without knowledge of the plaintiffs
right thereto, except such profits as accrued therefrom after such defendant had
actual notice or knowledge thereof.'2 62  No explanation was found in the
legislative record for this limitation on the defendant's profits remedy. Given the
expressed intention of codifying the common law, it is fair to assume the drafters
included this limitation to reflect the majority view that an accounting of
defendant's profits would not be awarded where the infringement was innocent.
Having noted the early bills' inclusion of this limitation on the defendant's
profits remedy, it is worth noting that no such limitation was included with respect
to the actual damages remedy. In other words, under these early bills, an innocent
infringer would not be required to account for its own profits, but would be liable
for any actual damages proven by plaintiff. The different treatment of damages
and profits in the early bills was consistent with the common law practice at the
time, and tends to confirm the proposition that these bills sought to codify the
common law rules.
Finally, the early bills included the limitation that any modified monetary award
"constitute compensation and not a penalty." '263 This limitation remained in all
subsequent bills. It is somewhat interesting that the limitation was included only
in the section that authorized courts to increase or decrease monetary awards,
S 18 (1925); S. 2547, 69th Cong. § 18 (1926); H.R. 13486, 69th Cong. § 18 (1926); S. 4811, 69th
Cong. § 18 (1926); H.R 6683, 70th Cong. § 18 (1927); H.RI 11988, 70th Cong. S 18 (1928); HP
13109, 70th Cong. § 18 (1928); H.R. 2828, 71st Cong. § 18 (1929).
'9 S. 2679, 68th Cong. § 18(h) (1924) (identical language in bills, supra note 258).
260 Id. §18(b).
261 Id. § 18(d).
262 Id. § 18(c).
Id. 18(d).
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which one could argue meant that accountings of defendant's profits could be
punitive so long as the award was not modified from the amount of profits
established by the evidence. If that was the intent, it would have represented a
change in the common law practice. The legislative record sheds no light on this
issue.
In 1938, Representative Lanham introduced his first bill, and the remedies
provision was different from that of all previous bills. The relevant parts of that
provision are set out below.2" There were a few important changes from the
earlier reform bills. The unusual damages language was replaced with simple,
direct terminology."6 The provision that injunctions would be nationwide was
removed, as was the constructive notice provisions of prior bills.266 The
"compensation and not a penalty language" remained in the subsection addressing
modified awards, and that subsection again contained no other limit on courts'
authority to increase or decrease such awards. The first Lanham bill also added
an attorney fees provision, that would have given courts authority to award fees
to a prevailing party.
Interestingly, the 1938 Lanham bill omitted language that prohibited awards
of defendant's profits where the infringement was innocent. No explanation was
found in the record for this significant change. Indeed, the first Lanham bill
appears to create an absolute right to an award of defendant's profits. It is,
however, difficult to determine the significance of this change given the absence
264 H.R. 9041, 75th Cong. § 34 (1938), provided:
(a) Any act declared unlawful under section 1 hereof is an act of infringement.
Any person who shall infringe in commerce any trade-mark registered under this
Act shall be liable-
(1) To an injunction restraining infringement of such registered trade-mark;
(2) To pay the damages occasioned by the infringement;
(3) To pay all profits which the infringer shall have made from such
infringement, and in proving profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove sales
only and the defendant shall be required to prove every element of cost or
deduction claimed;
(4) If the court shall find that the damages or profits or both are either
inadequate or excessive, the court, in its discretion, may decree the payment of
such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances of the
case, such sum to constitute compensation and not a penalty;
(8) In all actions and suits under this Act, full costs shall be allowed and the
court may award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs ....
26' Id § 34(a)(2).
26 Id. § 24 (providing that registration would have been "notice of the registrant's claim of
ownership thereof"). This change is somewhat surprising. It remained in Lanham's 1939 bill, H.R.
4744, 76th Cong. S 22 (1939), but the constructive notice approach returned in later bills and
became part of the Lanham Act of 1946. 15 U.S.C. 5 1072 (1946).
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of an explanation in the record, and the clear expression of congressional intent
to codify the common law rules on such issues.
In 1939, Representative Lanham introduced a revised bill. The remedies
section changed significantly, though again, no explanation of the changes could
be found in the legislative record.26 7 This bill contained a few important changes.
Most importantly, the monetary remedies provision was no longer limited to
infringements of registered marks, but extended coverage to the violation of any
"right to relief... under the Act ... ."6s This bill also introduced the "civil
action" to the trademark reform process, a change almost surely attributable to the
1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which merged the law and
equity systems in the federal courts.
This bill also used the simple reference to "defendant's profits," and "any
damages sustained by the plaintiff," language that would be used in the Lanham
Act. There was no discussion of whether a defendant's profits may be awarded
if the infringement is innocent, another change that remained in all subsequent
trademark reform bills and in the Lanham Act.
The 1939 Lanham bill also changed the provision allowing courts to modify
monetary awards. In this bill, courts were authorized to increase damages by up
to three times. The treble damages limitation was new, but it was hardly the only
change. Gone was the authority to increase or decrease a defendant's profits
award, and the authority to decrease a damages award also was removed. The
record does not explain why these changes were made.
SH.R. 4744, 76th Cong. § 33-34 (1939), provided:
The several courts vested with jurisdiction of civil actions arising under this Act
shall have power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity and
upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of
any right of the registrant of a trade-mark registered under this Act...
Whenever the plaintiff shall have established his right to relief in any civil action
arising under this Act, he shall be entitled to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2)
any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action. The court
shall assess such profits and damages or cause the same to be assessed under its
direction. In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant's
sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed. In
assessing damages the court may, according to the circumstances of the case,
include in the judgment any sum above the amount found as actual damages,
not exceeding three times such amount, such sum to constitute compensation
and not a penalty.
Prior bills, including Lanham's 1938 bill, had included all remedy provisions in a single section.
Lanham's 1939 bill changed that by creating a number of different sections, with each addressing
a relatively specific remedy issue.
m Id § 34.
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A companion bill to Lanham's 1939 bill was introduced in the Senate in
1941.269 This bill passed the Senate, was then revised by the House Committee on
Patents, and subsequently passed in the House, as amended.' The resulting bill,
which was sent to the Senate, contained substantially the same language
concerning injunctions, but the monetary relief section was revised, as shown
below.2"' The only substantive change to the remedies section was the inclusion
of language giving courts authority to increase or decrease profits awards.V2
Authority to modify damages awards remained limited to increasing such awards
up to three times, just as in the 1939 Lanham bill. The "compensation and not a
penalty" limitation now referred to "either of the above circumstances," a
reference apparently to increases of either damages or profits, though there is
some ambiguity in this text.
2 3
" S. 895, 77th Cong. (1941).
270 H.R. Rep. No. 77-2283 (1941).
271 H.R. 5461, 77th Cong. § 35 (1941), provided:
Whenever the plaintiff shall have established his right to relief in any civil action
arising under this Act, he shall be entitled (subject to the provisions of
section 29) to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the
plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action. The court shall assess such profits and
damages or cause the same to be assessed under its direction. In assessing
profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant's sales, only; defendant
must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed. In assessing damages the
court may enter judgment, according to the circumstances of the case, for any
sum above the amount found as actual damages not exceeding three times such
amount. If the court shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits
is either inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment
for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances
of the case. Such sum in either of the above circumstances shall constitute
compensation and not a penalty.
272 Id.
213 It is reasonable to assume the reference to "either" circumstance is to either an increase of
a damages award or an increase of a profits award. But the phrase follows the provisions allowing
courts to increase or decrease profits awards. It is plausible, though less likely, that the "either"
circumstances are an increase of profits or a decrease of profits. The latter construction makes less
sense because the restriction prohibits punitive awards, and increased monetary awards obviously
are more likely to be punitive than decreased awards.
Nevertheless, the procedure for fixing the amount of a profits award creates a real possibility
that such awards will exceed the actual net profits. If a defendant cannot present sufficient evidence
to support deductions from its gross revenue, the entire gross revenue could be awarded as
"profits." Such an award might well be punitive in nature. It is also possible that a decreased award
in such instances could remain punitive.
It also should be remembered that common law courts were beginning to award punitive
damages in trademark cases during this period. If Congress intended to codify the common law,
one could argue that the latter interpretation of the "either circumstances" reference is the only
interpretation consistent with the common law.
The 1939 Lanham bill, before being amended, would not support the latter interpretation.
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No further votes were taken on the trademark reform bills until 1945,274 when
Representative Lanham introduced yet another bill.2 75 The monetary relief section
follows:
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered
in the Patent Office shall have been established in any civil action
arising under this Act, the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the
provisions of sections 29 and 31 (1) (b), and subject to the principles
of equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages
sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action. The court
shall assess such profits and damages or cause the same to be
assessed under its direction. In assessing profits the plaintiff shall
be required to prove defendant's sales only; defendant must prove
all elements of cost or deduction claimed. In assessing damages the
court may enter judgment, according to the circumstances of the
case, for any sum above the amount found as actual damages, not
exceeding three times such amount. If the court shall find that the
amount of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or
excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such
sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances
of the case. Such sum in either of the above circumstances shall
constitute compensation and not a penalty." 6
This bill was changed from the prior, amended Lanham bill in two respects. First,
it limited relief to infringement of registered marks, a change that returned the
legislation to the scope of earlier bills. Second, the phrase "subject to the
principles of equity" was added just prior to the list of specific remedies. This
provision was approved by Congress and became Section 35 of the Lanham Act.
In the sixty-plus years since the Lanham Act was adopted, only two significant
changes have been made to Section 35. First, coverage was extended beyond
registered trademarks,2 7 a change that ironically reverted back to the scope of
Lanham's 1939 bill. The second change was the addition in 1975 of the right to
That bill on# authorized increased damages, but still included the "compensation and not a penalty"
limitation. Indeed, the only thing we can say with certainty regarding the use of this phrase in all
the various trademark reform bills is that 1939 Lanham bill unambiguously prohibited punitive
increases in actual damages.
" The record does not explain the lack of action during the remainder of 1941 or during 1942.
It is fair to assume, however, that the United States' involvement in World War II forced Congress
to deal with other, more pressing matters.
2 H.R. 1654, 79th Cong. § 35 (1945).
276 Id.
' See supra note 26.
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attorney fees in exceptional cases.27 Neither of these changes altered the
provisions relating to the remedies discussed in this Article.
The legislative history of the Lanham Act is rather long. The remedies
provisions changed only a few times, but some of the changes were significant.
We now turn to a discussion of what, if anything, the legislative record teaches
about specific remedies.
B. ACTUAL DAMAGES
The legislative record reveals only one material change to the damages
provisions of the various trademark reform bills. Early bills gave courts authority
to increase or decrease damages, profits, or both.279 The same language was
included in the first of the Lanham bills. 2s  This changed in the later Lanham
bills,2 ' and the resulting Lanham Act, as courts were authorized to increase a
damages award by up to three times, but the authorization to decrease a damages
award was removed.
Discussions found in the legislative record concerning the damages provisions
of the trademark reform bills do not provide additional insights into Congressional
intent. 2
278 See supra note 26. Representative Lanham also had proposed allowing prevailing parties to
receive attorney fees in his original 1938 bill, but that provision was later removed and was not part
of the original Lanham Act of 1946. H.R. 9041, 75th Cong. § 34(a)(8) (1938).
9 See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
H.R. 9041, 75th Cong. § 34 (1938).
251 See supra notes 268, 271-72, 275 and accompanying text.
22 For example, at the first hearing on the 1924 Ernst bill, Edward Rogers, a principal drafter
of the bill, made the following statements concerning damages:
There have been some very large recoveries recently in trade-mark cases, and
there have been some cases where there should be a recovery and there has not
been any, because the courts have been so hampered in the application of the
general equities ....
I do not know of a single case under the operation of the present Act where
there has been any attempt to get treble damages .... It seems to me to be
useless, and anything more than proper compensation, an artificial increase, is
in the nature of a penalty. So it seemed to us better to give the court discretion
to award damages which under all the circumstances of the case seemed to be
just, rather than arbitrarily to fix treble damages, particularly since the other
provision has been in the act for 20 years and has never, so far as I know, been
enforced.
Registration of Trade-marks: Joint Hearings on S. 2679 B jore the House and Senate Comms. on Patents, 68th
Cong. 47-48 (1925) (statement of Edward S. Rogers, Chairman Section of Patent, Trade-mark, and
Copyright Law, American Bar Association). The final statements suggest the 1905 Trademark Act
limited courts to either the amount of damages proven or treble that amount, which was not the
case. In fact, the 1905 Trademark Act and the 1924 Ernst bill Rogers was describing both
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C. DEFENDANT'S PROFITS
The defendant's profits remedy received more attention than any other remedy
during the legislative process. Every trademark reform bill introduced
between 1924 and 1932 contained the following limitation on this remedy: "but
there shall be no recovery of profits from any defendant whose adoption and use
of an infringing trade-mark was in good faith and without knowledge of the
plaintiff's right thereto, except such profits as accrued therefrom after such
defendant had actual notice or knowledge thereof.' '2" 3 No discussion of this
provision was found in the records of hearings on the many trademark reform
bills that led to the Lanham Act.
The early bills required, at a minimum, proof that a defendant had notice of
plaintiff's trademark before any profits could be awarded. Beyond that, however,
the text is not so clear. It refers to "knowledge of the plaintiff's [trademark]
right," which could be read as requiring proof that the defendant knew the
plaintiff had valid, enforceable trademark rights. The early bills contained only
this negative requirement. Indeed, no bill contained any description of the
substantive standard required to obtain a profits award.
Representative Lanham removed this text from the first bill he introduced, and
all remaining bills omitted this text, as well.2 4 No explanation for this change was
found in the record. Given this silence, it is not possible to determine why the
change was made or whether the change represents any particular intention of
Congress, other than to omit this negative requirement."s
Congressional intent is clear on another part of the provisions on profits.
Every bill, except Lanham's 1939 bill, gave courts the authority to increase or
decrease profits awards. When the power to decrease damages awards was
authorized increases up to three times. The difference was that courts would have been authorized
by the Ernst bill to increase ordecrease damages awards. But, as noted above, that grant of authority
was removed from later bills and was not included in the Lanham Act.
3 See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 264-76.
s It could be argued that this change indicates an intention by Congress to allow courts to
award defendant's profits even where the defendant "was in good faith and without knowledge of
the plaintiff's right." At least one commentator has made this argument. See Stolte, supra note 12,
at 295 n.127 ("It is fair to assume, therefore, that Congress tacitly rejected the necessity of proving
bad faith in order to obtain an accounting of profits.").
On the other hand, it is possible that Congress felt the statement simply did not belong, given
the absence of any reference to the affirmative requirements for obtaining a profits award. Or
maybe Congress felt this point already was well-established in the common law, making the text
unnecessary, particularly in light of the express intention to codify common law rules. Or maybe
Representative Lanham had some unstated reason for the change, but others in Congress either
didn't notice or didn't care. Many speculative arguments are possible given this change, but the lack
of any clear evidence in the record leaves one without any way to evaluate such arguments.
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removed from the latter Lanham bills, as noted above, no corresponding change
was made to the courts' power to adjust awards of defendant's profits. It is clear,
therefore, that Congress intended to provide courts with flexibility concerning the
size of profits awards.
The record of the hearings on the trademark reform bills provides additional
support for this conclusion. In the first hearing held, in early 1925, Edward
Rogers, the principal drafter of the 1924 Ernst bill, referred to "some very large
recoveries recently in trade-mark cases,"' as justification for the new provision
allowing courts to increase or decrease profits awards. In a later hearing, there is
a discussion between Mr. Rogers and a committee member about an award of
about $5,000,000 in a trademark case.2 7 The large awards that concerned Rogers
and some members of Congress were awards of defendant's profits."5
Given these large profits awards, and the concerns expressed at the hearings,
it is clear why Congress granted courts the power to increase or decrease profits
awards. The primary purpose of this part of the remedies provision was to allow
courts to decrease awards of defendant's profits to avoid excessive windfalls for
plaintiffs.
Finally, late in the legislative process, the phrase "subject to the principles of
equity" was inserted in the remedy provision. Though it appears this limitation
on courts' authority applies to damages, profits, and costs, it is more likely that the
change was directed to the profits remedy. After all, this remedy originated in
equity and thus had been "subject to the principles of equity" throughout the
history of trademark law. But regardless of whether the limitation was meant to
apply to all monetary remedies or only to the profits remedy, the reference is to
equity practice. For that reason, one must look to the equity cases to understand
the meaning of the phrase.
' Registration of Trade-marks: Joint Hearings on S. 2679 Before the House and Senate Comms. on
Patents, 68th Cong. 47 (1925) (statement of Edward S. Rogers, Chairman Section of Patent, Trade-
mark, and Copyright Law, American Bar Association).
7 Proposed Bills to Provide for the Registration and Protection of Trade-Marks: Heanngs on H.tL 102,
H.R 5461 andS. 895,77th Cong. 204-06 (1941) (statement of Edward S. Rogers, Chairman Section
of Patent, Trade-mark, and Copyright Law, American Bar Association).
"' The two cases mentioned in the legislative history as examples of large monetary awards are
L P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. Win. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 20 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1927), modified, 277 U.S. 97 (1928),
and Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. W1olfBrothers & Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916). In fact, the case that
supposedly awarded $5,000,000 was the Larson case, discussed in part II.c.5, supra. The gross profits
in that case were over $5,000,000, but the ultimate award was about $1.35 million. Larson, 20 F.2d
at 831, 836. That was a very large monetary award, particularly for the 1920s. No damages were
awarded. Id at 836-37.
The Hamilton-Brown Shoe case is also discussed in part II.C.5, supra. The profits award in that
case was about $450,000. Nominal damages of $1 were awarded. Wolf Bros. & Co. v. Hamilton-
Brown Shoe Co., 192 F. 930, 935 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1912).
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The preceding part of this Article provides an overview of the historical
development of the accounting of defendant's profits remedy. 9  From that
discussion, it is clear the accounting remedy was awarded only when the equities
of the case-that is, as between plaintiff and defendant-clearly favored the
plaintiff. Not only did the equity courts require proof that defendant acted with
deceptive intent, but equity also denied accountings when defendants could
establish an equitable defense. The final point is important. Equity courts denied
accountings even where defendant intentionally infringed if the plaintiff was also
guilty of some sort of equitable misconduct.
It is, however, hard to be sure what Congress meant by this phrase. It was
added late in the legislative process, and no discussion of the change was found
in the legislative record. In fact, it appears this reference to equity was added at
the request of a leading trademark attorney of the period.' Given the
circumstances, it is quite possible that most members of Congress paid little, if
any, attention to this seemingly minor change.
That is the extent of the guidance found in the legislative record. It is not
particularly helpful. The issue that has caused the most controversy-whether a
plaintiff must prove deceptive intent to recover a defendant's profits-was never
discussed by Congress. And the issue Congress did discuss--decreasing a profits
award-has rarely happened.
D. INJUNCTIONS
The Lanham Act's injunction provision has never been a source of difficulty.
In fact, the primary reason for including injunctions in the discussion is the key
role this remedy played in the development of the larger remedial scheme, a point
explained in the prior part of this Article.
There is, however, one interesting fact concerning injunctions in the legislative
record. The early bills expressly stated that injunctions would be nationwide, and
not limited to the plaintiff's common law trade area. This language is a direct
response to the Metcalf\Rectanus doctrine described above. Representative
Lanham dropped this language from his bills, but its presence in the early bills
shows the impact the Supreme Court's territoriality decisions had in starting the
trademark law reform process.
s See supra Parts II.A.3, II.B.2, II.c.2, II.c.5.
Koelemay, supra note 93, at 485.
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E. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The issue of punitive monetary relief is perhaps the most puzzling aspect of
the legislative process. The 1905 Trademark Act authorized law and equity courts
to award enhanced damages up to three times the amount of damages shown.
Courts seemed to interpret this as a punitive damages provision, though no cases
were found that used the authority. In addition, common law courts clearly were
moving toward the acceptance of punitive damages during the pre-Lanham Act
period.
Given this context, why did every trademark reform bill include the limitation
"such sum to constitute compensation and not a penalty," or words to the same
effect? The legislative record provides some insight into why this language was
used, but in the end, the record is somewhat confusing on this point.
The issue was discussed during the first hearing of the reform process. In early
1925, a joint hearing of the Senate and House of Representatives Committees on
Patents was held.291 Edward Rogers testified extensively at the hearing. In
explaining the remedies provision of the proposed bill (i.e., the 1924 Ernst bill),
Rogers began by pointing out that there had been some large monetary awards in
recent trademark cases.292 As noted above, these large judgments were awards of
defendants' profits, not actual or enhanced damages. There seems to have been
some agreement by committee members that such awards were too large.
293
After identifying this problem-excessive profits awards-Rogers goes on to
note that the treble damages provision of the 1905 Act was never used and
seemed to him "to be useless, and anything more than proper compensation, an
artificial increase, is in the nature of a penalty." This is the most direct reference
found in the record to the "compensation and not a penalty" language.
But this doesn't really make sense. Rogers' testimony refers to "an artificial
increase" in damages as being in the nature of a penalty. That is true, but it is also
true that common law courts granted punitive damages in trademark cases. Why
the concern with such an award being in the "nature of a penalty?" And why use
the word "penalty," rather than punitive, exemplary, or vindictive? The latter
terms were frequently used in early common law cases to identify punitive
damages awards. The term penalty is hard to find in such cases.
References to a "penalty" are found in equity cases, not actions at law. There
was a well-established rule by this time that equity would not enforce a penalty.
Moreover, equity courts would evaluate the monetary remedy sought to determine
if it was "in the nature of a penalty," and if it was, equity would refuse to grant the
a See supra note 282.
z See spra note 282.
See supra note 282.
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remedy. The very wording Rogers used can be found in numerous equity cases,
but was rarely, if ever, used in cases brought in the law courts.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Hamilton-Brown Shoe, made clear that the
accounting remedy was equitable, and for that reason, had to be compensatory,
and not in the nature of a penalty. This was one of the most important trademark
cases of the period, and one Rogers would have known well.
It is likely the prohibition of penalties included in the various trademark reform
bills was actually intended to apply only to awards of defendant's profits. There
are two strong arguments supporting this conclusion. First, the specific concern
identified by Rogers and committee members was that some awards of
defendant's profits were too large. There was a clear intent to rein in such awards.
Making it clear that an award of profits could not be punitive effectuated that
intent.
Second, Rogers and others made clear that the Lanham Act was intended to
codify the common law rules, except with respect to the new registration scheme
being created. In other words, the remedies provision was supposed to be
codifying the common law. The common law rule at the time was that an award
of defendant's profits had to be compensation, not a penalty. But the common
law did not include any such limitation on damages. Including a blanket
prohibition against any form of punitive monetary award was a break with the
common law.
If Congress intended to change the common law on this point, surely there
would have been some discussion of why the change was needed. But all we find
are the statements of Rogers provided above. Courts and commentators have
largely agreed that the Lanham Act prohibits punitive damages," and that is a fair
reading of the text of the Act. One also could argue that Rogers' statements
during the 1925 hearing support the same conclusion. On the other hand, it is
impossible to square this reading of the statute with the Congressional intent to
codify the common law.
One additional aspect of the legislative history is worth noting. In
Representative Lanham's second bill, the language granting courts the authority
to increase or decrease profits awards is missing. The no penalty text, however,
remains. In that bill, therefore, the no penalty limitation had to apply to increased
damages awards. No other interpretation is possible based on the actual text of
that bill.
This language, however, may have been unintentional. A subsequent
committee report amended this bill by authorizing courts to increase or decrease
profits awards. With this amendment, the no penalty clause followed two separate
sentences. The first sentence refers to increasing damages, and the second to
See supra note 10.
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increasing or decreasing profits. There is no explanation in the record for this
change. Given the concern with large profits awards noted above, it is quite
possible the omission of the power to increase or decrease profits from Lanham's
second bill was unintentional.295
In the end, one is left without any clear answers on the punitive damages issue.
The legislative record does contain some evidence that Congress intended to
prohibit punitive damages. But the record also makes clear that Congress
intended to codify the common law, 6 and the historical review provided above
indicates that punitive damages were available at common law.29 These two
intentions seem to point in opposite directions, and yet the legislative history is
silent as to such a conflict. Why Congress included the "not a penalty" language
in the Lanham Act remains a mystery.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A number of conclusions may be drawn from the historical analysis presented
above. Two will be discussed here, one specific and one general. The specific
conclusion relates to the long-running controversy over whether proof of willful
infringement should be required to obtain an accounting of defendant's profits.
The general, and more significant, conclusion relates to the need for sweeping
reform of the Lanham Act's remedial scheme.
A. WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT AND THE DEFENDANT'S PROFITS REMEDY
What must a plaintiff prove in order to recover a defendant's profits in a
trademark case? This question has divided courts and commentators for many
years." s The historical evidence reviewed above may help resolve this controversy.
In order to reach an agreement on this issue, the debating parties must first agree
upon what the relevant questions are.
If one takes the position that the Lanham Act text is clear and unambiguous
on its face, then the historical analysis presented in this Article adds nothing to the
debate. It is, however, difficult to seriously contend that the monetary remedies
provision resolves this issue without any need to look beyond the statutory text.
5 This bill was a major rewrite of Lanham's first bill. With all the changes made, it may be that
the language granting courts the power to increase or decrease profits awards was inadvertently
omitted. It is difficult to understand why this portion of the remedies provision would have been
removed, given that the concerns over excessive money judgments were based on large profits
awards. Why eliminate the one part of the remedies provision that would give courts the power to
reduce profits awards that are too large?
2 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.4, JI.c.4.
2" See supra note 12.
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It is true that the statute says a prevailing party "shall be entitled" to a "defendant's
profits," but it is also true that this entitlement is "subject to the principles of
equity." The text gives no indication whatsoever of what the latter limitation
means. To give that limitation any meaning, one must go beyond the statutory
text.
If it is agreed that the statute does not resolve this issue, it follows that
Congressional intent should guide the search for meaning outside the text. What
did Congress intend? Congress intended to codify the common law on many
issues, apparently including remedies issues.2 There is no clear indication in the
Congressional record of an intention to depart from the common law rules
governing the defendant's profits remedy.3°°
The question, therefore, becomes: what was the common law rule? The
historical analysis presented above does help answer this question. A trademark
owner had to prove willful infringement to obtain an accounting of defendant's
profits in a common law action during the early twentieth century. 1 If Congress
intended to codify the common law on this point, then the Lanham Act also
requires proof of willful infringement to obtain a profits award.
A counterargument may be made based on the differences between substantive
trademark law rules today and those of the early twentieth century. Courts during
the early twentieth century presumed deceptive intent any time a technical
trademark was copied.3 2 At least one leading case found willful infringement
largely because defendant's use was intentional, that is because the defendant
intended to use the trademark it used.3"3 That's not much of a willfulness
showing, and it clearly would not suffice today.
One could make a compelling argument that the willful infringement
requirement of the early twentieth century common law trademark cases has no
place in modern trademark law. This argument is compelling because so much
has changed. Courts no longer presume willful infringement just because the
plaintiffs trademark is found to be inherently distinctive. The very concept of
intent has been refined by modern courts, so that the inquiry today is whether a
defendant intended to trade on the plaintiff's goodwill. 4 That is the proper
inquiry, but it is quite different from the willfulness analysis found in some
common law trademark cases from the early twentieth century.
This argument is a strong one if the objective is persuading Congress to change
the Lanham Act. But the argument is much less persuasive if the question is how
See supra note 19.
See supra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
301 See supra Part II.c.2.
32 See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
" See spra note 180.
304 See supra note 180.
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to properly interpret the statute. If Congress intended to adopt the common law
standards, willful infringement is required to obtain an accounting.
B. IT'S TIME TO START OVER
We need remedial rules in trademark cases that serve the needs of the twenty-
first century, not rules based on early twentieth century common law rules. The
current rules seldom provide an appropriate monetary remedy and instead tend
to undercompensate or overcompensate prevailing trademark owners.
Undercompensation is more common, as most prevailing plaintiffs are unable to
accurately quantify their injury or prove willful infringement. But
overcompensation is also a problem, because awards of defendant's profits
sometimes go well beyond any likely injury to the plaintiff and thus constitute
windfalls. Little can be said in support of a monetary remedy scheme that rarely
provides appropriate relief.
Three points are made in the following sections. First, the modern treatment
of the defendant's profits remedy is examined. This remedy has become the be-all
monetary award in modern Lanham Act cases. The results are troubling. In the
second section, a recent case is used to illustrate the problems with the modern
use of the defendant's profits remedy. Finally, in the third section, a few proposals
for reform are presented.
1. Modern Courts Have Distorted the Tradiional, and Appropriate, Pupose of the
Defendant's Profits Remedy. The defendant's profits remedy has become the primary
monetary remedy in Lanham Act cases. Actual damages are hard to quantify in
most modern trademark cases, and courts have held that punitive damages are not
available under the Lanham Act's primary monetary relief provision. That leaves
the profits remedy to serve all the purposes traditionally served by monetary
remedies. An accounting of defendant's profits is, as a practical matter, the sole
remedy available to compensate injured plaintiffs, to undo unjust enrichment of
infringing defendants, and to punish particularly malicious or wanton behavior.
The defendant's profits remedy is, at least in theory, an appropriate means to
undo unjust enrichment. After all, what better way to address unjust enrichment
than to force an infringer to disgorge the enrichment (i.e., the ill gotten gains of
the infringement)? But under the Lanham Act, this remedy fails to effectively
perform even this traditional function. Unjust enrichment, by definition, involves
two elements: injustice and a gain due to the injustice. Any remedy used to deal
with unjust enrichment should take into account both the extent of the injustice
and the size of the resulting enrichment. Under the Lanham Act, the profits
remedy fails in both respects.
Any gain obtained through trademark infringement is unjustified, even if the
infringement is unintentional. If the profits remedy is to undo unjust enrichment,
this remedy should not be limited to cases involving willful infringement. By
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codifying this common law requirement, Congress adopted a remedy that leaves
many unjust gains in the pockets of infringers. On the other hand, Congress did
give federal courts the authority to increase or decrease profits awards according
to the circumstances of the case. This power should be used-but rarely is
used-to match the size of a profits award to the extent of the infringer's
culpability. Congress' decision to codify the common law, combined with the
federal courts' failure to exercise their power to tailor the size of profits awards to
match the offense, has rendered the profits remedy ineffective as a means of
undoing unjust enrichment.
The profits remedy does an even poorer job of serving the other two purposes
of monetary relief. Historically, accountings were provided in equity to
compensate injured trademark owners. In early trademark disputes, there
probably was a reasonably close correlation between the defendant's profits as a
result of the infringement and the plaintiff's lost profits. But such a correlation
will seldom exist today, given the many complexities of modern markets. And
because the amount of any profits award in a modern trademark case depends
primarily on the size of the deductions allowed by a court, the profits remedy can
no longer be viewed as a compensatory award.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Lanham Act's remedial scheme is the
use of the profits remedy as a de facto punitive award. By conditioning this
remedy on proof of willful infringement, and explicitly recognizing deterrence as
a distinct rationale for granting accountings, courts have turned the old common
law rules on their head. The one traditionally equitable monetary remedy-the
accounting of defendant's profits-is now being used as a penalty, a result that
never would have occurred at common law."0
The profits remedy is, at best, a very crude tool for punishing bad actors. To
be an effective and appropriate punitive remedy, a monetary award should do two
things: (1) the award should cause some financial harm or hardship to the
infringer; and, (2) the award should be tailored to the infringer's culpability. The
computational process mandated by the Lanham Act will not consistently produce
profits awards that impose real hardship on infringers. If the infringing business
was not profitable or was merely a small part of a much larger operation, the
magnitude of a resulting profits award will do little, if anything, to punish or deter.
Nor does the Lanham Act process result in profits awards tailored to the actual
offense. Not all bad actors are equal. It is simply a matter of common sense that
a defendant who is more culpable should receive harsher punishment than one
who is less culpable. The profits remedy, as defined by the Lanham Act, does not
achieve this result. The magnitude of a profits award in a modern trademark case
is not linked to the level of culpability of the defendant.
305 See spra note 14 and accompanying text.
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2. An Illustraive Recent Case. A recent decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals provides a good example of the flaws in the current use of the
defendant's profits remedy.' ° The case involved a dispute over trademarks used
on parboiled rice produced in the United States and sold in Saudi Arabia.30 7 The
plaintiff, American Rice, Inc. (ARI), used a trademark featuring an image of a
girl." 8 Defendant, Producers Rice Mill, Inc. (PRMI), had used a somewhat similar
girl design on its product since 1985.309 In 2005, PRMI contracted to sell private
label rice in Saudi Arabia using a girl design different from the one it had used on
its own product since 1985.310 ARI objected to PRMI's proposed private label
design, and PRMI agreed to change that design.3 '
A few months after that agreement was reached, ARI sued PRMI, alleging that
the girl design PRMvfI had been using since 1985 infringed ARI's girl design
trademark. 31' ARI contended that it had been unaware of the PRMI girl design
until after the parties settled the private label dispute.313 PRI argued that the two
marks were different enough to avoid infringement and that ARI's claims should
be barred by laches. 3 " The district court found infringement, and further found
that PRMI adopted its girl design to trade on ARI's good will.315 The evidence of
willfulness was not strong,316 and it is somewhat surprising that ARI's long delay
did not bar monetary relief. The district ordered an accounting of PRMI's profits
based on the willful infringement finding.317
The district court based the accounting on PRMI's sales from 2005, and found
the gross sales revenue to be $1,256,635. 3 1' The court later awarded profits of
$227.10, and explained that any larger award "would be excessive and would
3 Am. Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 518 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2008).
307 Id. at 326.
3 Id.
310 id
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 334.
311 Id. at 328-29, 334.
31' Am. Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., No. H-05-3227, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47932,
at *6 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
316 The district court's finding on intent was based on the fact that "PRMI knew of the Abu Bint
brand, the related ARI Girl Design, and ARI's registration rights." Id at *10. "PRMI's intent was
to sell rice to distributors who would otherwise likely purchase rice from ARI." Id. The facts
showed that ARI controlled 65% of the market and charged a premium price. Some purchasers
wanted alternatives to ARI's more expensive product, and PRMI tried to tap into that part of the
market. That sounds more like an intent to compete than to infringe.
311 Id. at *10-11.
31s Id. at *10.
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constitute a penalty." '319 The district court also found that "there is no evidence
that sales by ARI were actually diverted ... "320
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the finding of willful infringement, but
vacated the $227.10 profits award. "Because § 1117(a) provides that a plaintiff can
recover as lost profits the sales of the infringer unless the infringer can prove
legitimate costs to reduce that sum (which PRMI did not do)," the Fifth Circuit
held that ARI was entitled to recover $1,256,635.321 The Fifth Circuit rejected the
district court's finding that any award greater than $227.10 would be a penalty,
because "it provided no explanation for this conclusion. ' ,322 The "profits" award
required by the Fifth Circuit was over 5,500 times larger than what the district
court awarded.
Consider the result in the American Rice case. Did the award of over $1.2
million serve any of the three possible justifications for monetary awards? Was
it compensation? The plaintiff, ARI, did not prove any lost sales or actual
confusion.323 And the district court expressly held that any award greater than
$227.10 would be excessive and punitive.324 No, the profits award in this case was
not compensation. It was clearly a windfall for the plaintiff, who, ironically,
already controlled 65% of the market for the products at issue.
325
Did the profits award in American Rice undo unjust enrichment? Yes, but the
award went well beyond disgorging ill-gotten gains. PRNH is a farmer-owned
cooperative, a fact that may have hindered its ability to establish costs and
deductions.3 26 That may have been why PRMI relied upon tax records, and may
help explain why the district court accepted that proof. What were the actual
319 Id. The profits figure was based on PRMI's taxable income. PRMI did not present evidence
of costs and deductions, but presented evidence from its tax records. The district court accepted
that evidence.
320 Id.
321 518 F.3d at 338. This statement illustrates yet another problem: confusion over the
distinction between damages and defendant's profits. Notice that the Fifth Circuit says "a plaintiff
can recover as lost profits the sales of the infringer .... " That is incorrect. Lost profits are
damages, the gains a plaintiff lost as a result of not making sales it would have made but for the
infringement. What the Fifth Circuit likely meant, giving them the benefit of the doubt, was that
a plaintiff may recover as "defendant's profits" the gross revenue from the infringing sales where
no costs or deductions are proven.
'22 Id. at 340.
12' 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47932, at *6, *10.
324 Id at "10.
323 518 F.3d at 326.
32 Id PRMI is a cooperative of rice farmers. The farmers supply rice to PRMI, which processes
and sells the rice. Profits flow through PRMI to the farmer members. Id. The costs and deductions
relevant to the sales in the American Rice case would have included some of the costs of the various
farmer members. Determining the proper costs and deductions under those circumstances would
be difficult.
[Vol. 17:245
72
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol17/iss2/3
CONFUSION CODIFIED
profits from PRMI's 2005 sales? We don't know. But we do know that the gross
sales revenue of about $1.25 million was not pure profit. The award in this case
disgorged far more than defendant's profits.
Was the award punitive? Yes, it was. There is no escaping this conclusion.
The district court found that only a small monetary award was justified.32 The
Fifth Circuit ignored that finding, and then skirted the entire issue of whether the
award was punitive. The Fifth Circuit referred to the Lanham Act's text,
Congress's desire to make trademark infringement unprofitable, and the different
rationales used to support profits awards. 328 But at no point did the Fifth Circuit
directly address the question of whether the award was punitive.
Why did the Fifth Circuit ignore the district court's decision that only a small
monetary award was justified? Even if the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district
court's analysis was incorrect, why didn't the appeals court defer to the trial judge's
discretion in fixing the appropriate remedy? That is, why didn't the Fifth Circuit
remand and allow the district court another chance to match the remedy to the
offense. Surely that is a task better suited to the trial court. The Fifth Circuit
relied heavily on the Lanham Act's computation process, but ignored the flexibility
and discretion given to trial courts by the very same section of the Act.329 It is a
bitter irony, because Congress clearly intended to give trial courts broad flexibility
to match the remedy to the offense.3" The trial judge tried to do that in the
American Rice case, but the Fifth Circuit upset that result.
It is hard to imagine a more inappropriate outcome that what occurred in the
American Rice case. The award was not compensatory. It went well beyond what
was needed to remedy unjust enrichment. It was an arbitrary punitive award one
that was not tailored to meet the nature of the offense.33' This result shows how
the Lanham Act's remedial scheme can lead to the worst possible outcome, rather
than a sensible monetary award.
3. A Few Proposals for Reform. It is time for Congress to repair the mess
described above. First, Congress should allow punitive damages. The current
scheme has not prevented punitive awards in Lanham Act cases, as the American
Rice case illustrates. Under the current scheme, federal courts endorse legal
fictions and engage in legal contortions. And if that were not bad enough, the
punitive awards granted by the federal courts in Lanham Act cases are arbitrary
R7 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47932, at *10.
328 518 F.3d at 340.
329 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
0 See supra notes 286-88.
331 It is worth noting that the Fifth Circuit panel divided in the American Rice case. Judge Jerry
Smith dissented because the two trademarks "do not look even remotely the same." 518 F.3d
at 341. Given this split, and the thin evidence of willfulness, one is left with a strong sense that
justice was not done in this case.
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and do not appropriately advance the legitimate goal of punishing particularly
egregious conduct.
Second, Congress should make clear that the accounting and damages remedies
serve distinct purposes. It is not helpful to characterize both remedies as
compensatory. Perhaps that characterization is true if one takes a very broad view
of compensation, but even then the usage is misleading. When the term
compensatory is used to describe a type of damages, the term takes on a specific,
and somewhat narrow, meaning. Compensatory damages are those actual losses
a plaintiff is able to quantify with reasonable specificity. The accounting of
defendant's profits remedy is not used in that manner in modem trademark cases.
It is best to save the concept of compensation for the damages remedy.
Accountings should be awarded to remedy unjust enrichment. The goal
should be to render trademark infringement unprofitable, while adhering to
equitable principles. At least a part of the infringer's profits should be awarded
in many cases, including some cases where the infringement is innocent. Courts,
however, should have broad discretion to disallow, decrease, or increase the
amount of profits calculated through the accounting process. When the
infringement issue is close, the infringement innocent, and the plaintiff is unable
to show any actual economic injury, a court should be reluctant to award profits.
This is the kind of flexible analysis needed to advance the purposes of trademark
law.
Actual damages should be used to compensate injured trademark owners. The
current scheme is unacceptable because prevailing plaintiffs routinely go
uncompensated, despite the general agreement that trademark infringement causes
real economic injury. Perhaps a statutory damages approach similar to that of
copyright law should be adopted. Or perhaps Congress should approve a
reasonable royalty approach. This issue warrants more study.
Third, and finally, Congress should consider relaxing the standard for
recovering attorney fees. Under the current "exceptional case" standard, attorney
fees are rarely awarded.332 When willful infringement is found, however, a plaintiff
may receive both an unduly large profits award and an attorney fees award. The
current approach only exacerbates the extreme divergence of outcomes in
trademark cases. Most prevailing parties get nothing, but a few get far more than
is warranted. Some consideration should be given to allowing attorney fees to be
awarded in lieu of actual damages, an approach that would ensure prevailing
parties are not left uncompensated for their injury and facing enormous legal bills.
That is the typical outcome for the prevailing trademark owner in modem
trademark cases. It is hard to call that a just result.
332 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
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During a hearing on one of the bills that led to the Lanham Act, Edward
Rogers, a key player in the reform effort, and Representative Lanham had the
following exchange:
Rogers: the whole purpose of this section [1117], Mr. Chairman,
was to give a thing that is now inflexible, a certain flexibility and rely
on the good judgment of the court to see that the recovery was not
excessive but was at least adequate....
Representative Lanham: We have to rely upon the courts in their
discretion to administer these things fairly. I do not know what
other assumption that we can make.
333
They were right. We need a flexible remedial scheme that allows and encourages
courts to craft remedies that match the circumstances of each case. The current
Lanham Act monetary relief scheme has developed into an overly rigid, arbitrary
system that rarely produces the correct outcome. Little can be said in support of
such a system.
... Proposed Bills to Provide for the Reistration and Protection of Trade-Marks: Hearings on H.R. 102,
H.R 5461 and S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-marks of the House Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 206
(1941) (statement of Edward S. Rogers, Chairman Section of Patent, Trade-mark, and Copyright
Law, American Bar Association).
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